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ABSTRACT,
This experiment was designed to study the effect 
of different channels of one-way communication on the 
"behavior of subjects in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, with 
varying partner friendliness and subject trust. This 
was a 4x2x2 factorial design experiment, with four levels 
of communication— face-to-face, television, telephone 
and written— two levels of partner affect— friendly 
and unfriendly— -and two trust levels, as measured by 
the Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale— high and low.
Each subject played against a preprogrammed set of commu­
nications and responses sent to her by the experimenter, 
who led her to believe that she was actually playing 
against a real person. Although no effects were attri­
buted to the trust variable, it was found that (1) subject 
in the face-to-face and television communication condi­
tions cooperated significantly more than subjects in the 
telephone communication condition: and (2) that subjects 
playing a friendly confederate cooperated significantly 
more than subjects playing this same unfriendly confe­
derate. However, both of these results seem due prima­
rily to the low degree of cooperation when an unfriendly 
confederate communicated by telephone.
iii
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INTRODUCTION
There is research evidence to indicate that the 
average person spends about seventy percent of his active 
hours communicating— listening, speaking, reading and 
writing, in that order (Berio, I960). Therefore, commu­
nication is a variable extremely worthy of experimental 
consideration.
The development in recent years of psychological 
games has afforded an excellent opportunity for inves­
tigators to study the hypothesized influence of communi­
cation in interpersonal interactions. The most common 
two-person game used in this study has been the prisoner* s 
dilemma (PD) game. Appendix A, figure 1, presents the 
prototype of the PD game. The PD game induces, in a 
restricted and well-defined context, the same kinds of 
events that occur in the more complex social relations: 
sometimes one person gains and the other loses, sometimes 
both gain or lose simultaneously. For example, using the 
PD game in Appendix A, figure 2, two subjects are simul­
taneously faced with the decision of choosing either 
black or red.. The numbers in the cells represent the 
potential gains for each player, the numbers on the 
right indicating the outcomes to person a and the numbers 
on the left denoting the outcomes to person B. If both 
players choose black, then both gain. However, if one 
chooses black and the other red, the latter gains more
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2than if he had chosen black and the former gains less. 
Finally, if both choose red, then both gain considerably 
less than if they had both chosen black. Therefore, the 
PD game has been referred to as a mixed-motive game in 
that, in it, the goals of the individuals are partially 
in conflict and partially coincident with each other, 
and the individuals involved must somehow resolve this 
partial conflict of motives. The mutual black strategy 
represents the maximum long-term gain over successive 
choices (cooperation) while the red strategy, although 
granting maximum immediate gain, dooms the player to 
lose in the long run (competition).
The PD game presents a situation that depends 
on the two players trusting each other to select the 
cooperative mutual long-term gain strategy, knowing that 
an unreciprocated cooperative response is detrimental to 
their own interests, and very profitable for the other 
person. In trust there is "...an implicit assumption 
that one person will not deliberately hurt the other to 
satisfy his own needs..." (Bennis et al., 1964, p. 223).
The PD literature abounds with studies which 
indicate that this trust does not develop; in fact, 
players adopt a competitive, short-term strategy which 
restricts gains far below' those potentially available 
(Rapoport, 1963). However, in the typical PD game that 
characterizes these studies, subjects were allowed no
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
explicit communication avenues: they remained unaware 
of the other1s intentions and could learn of the other 
person's choice on the previous trial only at the end 
of the trial when the experimenter announced the outcome 
of that session. This is insufficient to create a 
cooperative relationship. Bixenstine et al. (1963) 
investigated the effects of such indirect communication 
by programming one person's choice sequences; they found 
that a very high percentage of unilateral cooperative 
choices during the early trials was required to induce 
a cooperative relationship between the subjects. Since 
the mere sequence of choice is inappropriate in inducing 
two subjects to cooperate, perhaps permitting them to 
communicate with each other before selecting a strategy 
would allow then to commit themselves not to hurt each 
other and would help establish an atmosphere of trust.
A number of investigators have introduced this 
communication variable into PD research to see if commu­
nication would increase trust and cooperation between 
subjects. A definition of interpersonal trust in the 
communication process has been put forward by Giffin (1967) 
as " a reliance upon the communication behavior of another 
person in order to achieve a desired but uncertain 
objective in a risky situation" (p. 105). Therefore, 
the opportunity to communicate should help subjects to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4arrive at a mutual understanding with respect to their 
proposed game-behavior. As a result, assuming that 
subjects are oriented toward gaining as much as possible, 
as they should be, one would predict a significant 
increase in cooperative responses.
Most studies using communication as an indepen­
dent variable in PD research have indicated that commu­
nication does increase cooperation between participants 
(Bixenstine & Douglas, 1967; Bixenstine et al., 1966; 
Deutsch, 1958, I960; Loomis, 1959; Terhune, 1968; Wallace 
& Rothaus, 1969; Wichman, 1970). However, these conclu­
sions are laden with restrictions associated with the 
specific circumstances of the experiment. For example, 
Deutsch (1958, I960) indicated that communication between 
subjects engaged in a PD game facilitated cooperation 
only when subjects were instructed to conc.ern themselves 
with their own gains (individualistic orientation): 
communication had no significant effect on cooperation 
for subjects instructed to gain as much as possible for 
themselves and for the other (cooperative orientation) 
and for subjects instructed to beat the other as much 
as possible (competitive orientation). This observation 
was further supported by Scodel et al. (1959) who noted 
that the opportunity to communicate had no effect on the 
strategies of the subjects -who had become entrenched in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5a competitive relationship. Deutsch (1958) also noted 
that any ameliorating effects of communication in a PD 
game were a function of the number of minimum ingredients 
of cooperative interchange— expectation, intention, 
retaliation, absolution— contained in the message.
Loomis (1959) supported this notion that cooperation 
increases as a function of the completeness of the 
communication.
Most of the investigators who have studied 
the effect of communication on trust and cooperation in 
the PD game have limited their efforts to only a single 
channel of communication: either written or spoken.
For example, Deutsch (1958) and Terhune (1968) allowed 
their subjects to write notes to each other while Scodel 
et al. (1959) and Bixenstine et al. (1966) permitted 
communication on a face-to-face level. This type of 
research does not permit a comparison of the effect of 
different channels of communication on the cooperative 
behavior of subjects in a PD game. The communication 
channel, as an independent variable, has been an over­
looked consideration in PD research; it may be an 
important factor in determining the extent to which players 
will be trusting enough to select the risky cooperative 
strategy in the PD game.
Various communication channels may incorporate
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
either one, or two, or all three modes of communication: 
(a) linguistic, (b) paraiinguistic, and (c) visual.
The linguistic mode refers to the words that convey 
the primary message. The paraiinguistic mode refers to 
the emphasis of certain words above others, the pattern 
of intonation and timing, which provide nonverbal cues 
that contribute to the meaning of the communication,
In addition to the linguistic and the paraiinguistic 
modes of communication, visual modes such as facial 
expressions and gestures provide nonverbal cues that 
make up a background against which the communication is 
displayed. A written communication capitalizes only on 
the linguistic mode of communication. A telephone 
communication would include the linguistic and para­
iinguistic modes of communication. Communication by 
means of television or to a greater extent face-to-face 
communication would incorporate all three modes of 
communication.
What is required is a study in which communi­
cation channels which include either one, or two, or all 
three modes of communication are made available to 
different subjects., and the results are compared across 
experimental conditions.
Wichman (1970) has already provided some indi­
cation that the effectiveness of a communication channel
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7in allowing subjects to learn to cooperate in a PD game 
may be a function of the number of communication modes 
included in the channel. In this study, cooperation was 
shown to be significantly higher for subjects who could 
see and speak to each other than for subjects who could 
either only see or only speak to each other. Wichman 
expMined that combining different modes of communication 
increases the efficiency of the communication channel so 
that the subjects can provide the social contingencies 
which allow them to cooperate with each other.
However, another study conducted for the British 
government, investigating information transmission for 
face-to-face and telephone communication, found no 
significant differences between the conditions (Commu­
nications Studies Group, 1970).
Following these leads, this study was undertaken 
to develop experimental evidence as to the influence of 
four communication channels— written, telephone, tele­
vision and face-to-face--on the behavior of subjects 
in a PD game. It was hypothesized that results would 
show an increasing amount of cooperation from the 
written communication condition (mode a), to the telephone 
communication condition (mode a, b), to the television 
and face-to-face communication conditions (mode a, b, c).
Since every prisoner's dilemma situation is an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8interpersonal situation characterized by relatively 
continuous affective interchanges among participants, 
affect was another dimention worth considering in this 
context. Since Davitz (1964) and Hunt and Lin (1967) 
have already indicated that subjects can reliably judge 
a communicator's feelings or attitudes on the basis of 
that person's communication, the quality of affect 
between players can be manipulated by enlisting the 
support of a confederate to present himself as either a 
warm, friendly person or a cold, hostile person. It 
was hypothesized, in this experiment, that subjects 
interacting with a friendly person would react more 
favorably toward that person and, as a result, would 
play more cooperatively than subjects interacting with 
a hostile person.
A third variable considered in this study consisted 
in Rotter's Interpersonal Trust Scale (Rotter, 1967).
This scale is based on the notion that people differ 
in the extent to which they believe that the promised 
negative or positive reinforcemtnts will occur when 
promised by other people; such expectancies would probably 
generalize from one communicator to another (Rotter,
1967). Prom these assumptions, Rotter constructed 
his Interpersonal Trust Scale to measure a person's 
generalized expectancy that the promises of other indi­
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9viduals with regard to future "behavior can "be relied 
upon (Rotter, 1967).
An adequate measure of interpersonal trust would 
he extremely valuable in research such as this one, 
which involves the communication of information. A 
number of investigators have indicated that people who 
trust others are also more trustworthy, or cooperative 
(Deutsch, 1958, I960; Loomis, 1959). Therefore, with 
regards to the present study, it was hypothesised that 
subjects who scored high on the Rotter Interpersonal 
Trust Scale would cooperate more than those who scored 
low on the scale.
In summary, therefore, this study was designed 
to investigate cooperation in a PD game as a function 
of (1) communication channel, (2) friendliness of 
opponent and (3) trust of subject as measured by the 
Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects for this experiment were 54 female 
undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology 
at the University of 7/indsor during the 1970-71 winter 
session. The experimenter distributed approximately 
250 questionnaires (see Materials) to males and females 
in introductory psychology. They were able to indicate 
their desire to participate in the experiment on the 
questionnaire. During recruitment, no mention was made 
as to the precise nature of the study except that the 
subjects would be interacting with another person in 
the experiment. Subjects were also informed that the 
experiment would take forty-five minutes of their time 
and that they would earn money as a result of their 
participating. The questionnaires of the seventy 
females who indicated a desire to participate were 
scored and the subjects were contacted by telephone. 
Payment of Subjects
Subjects were paid in accordance to their accu­
mulated outcomes over the twenty-trial experiment,
Subjects received payment immediately after the experi­
ment .
Materials
The payoff matrix was presented as shown in 
Appendix B. One subject (the "I choose" subject)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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indicated her choice of alternatives by placing a marker 
on either one of the two solid colored circles, while 
the other subject (the "Other chooses" subject) indicated 
her choice by placing her marker on either one of the two 
striped colored circles. This was the same matrix 
used by Scodel et al. (1959) and by Wichman (1970).
This matrix has a low "cooperative index", a term used 
by Terhune (1968) to refer to the ratio (X^-X^J/tXyXg) > 
which relates positively to cooperation tendency (Rapo- 
port & Chammah, 1965). Therefore, with this matrix 
which has a low cooperative index, the tendency to 
cooperate is low because a subject is highly rewarded 
for choosing the non-cooperative strategy.
During the recruitment period, the experimenter 
administered to several classes of introductory psycho­
logy students the Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale 
(Rotter, 1967) (see Appendix C).
At the end of the experiment, subjects completed 
three sets of semantic differential rating scales— one 
set to rate the other person, another to rate the experi­
ment itself, and finally another to rate the messages 
(see Appendix D). The paired opposites of the first 
set were selected on the basis of their mention in a 
review of the attitude change literature (Lindzey & 
Aronson. 1968). For the "Other Person" and "Experiment"
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
12
rating scales, a table of random numbers was used to 
determine the order in which the pairs were to be presented. 
In addition, since the original item pairs had been 
designed in such a way that the first adjective carried 
positive connotations and the second negative connota­
tions, the table of random numbers was used to reverse 
half of the item pairs. The "Message" rating scale 
was constructed on the basis of Deutsch1s (1958) four 
ingredients of a cooperative interchange: intention,
expectation, retaliation, and absolution.
Instructions regarding the game and the experi­
ment were held constant by presenting them to the subjects 
by means of a tape recorder. Instructions specific to 
each communication condition were included at the end 
of each tape.
For the television communication condition, a 
television monitor was provided so that subjects could 
view the communicator. The subjects in the telephone 
communication condition were given access to a telephone 
through which they could hear the communications. For 
the written communication condition, notes were provided 
to the subjects.
Design
This experiment was a 4x2x2 factorial design, 
with manipulations of four communication dimensions—
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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face-to-face, television, telephone, and written— -two 
affective conditions— friendly and unfriendly— and two 
levels of interpersonal trust— high and low. Three 
subjects were assigned to each of the sixteen cells of 
this design.
In addition, a control group consisting of 
three high-trust and three low-trust subjects was run 
in which no explicit communication was allowed. This 
condition served as a base line against which to compare 
the other four communication conditions.
Subjects were assigned to the two trust groups 
on the basis of their scores on the Rotter Interpersonal 
Trust Scale. These scores ranged from 44 to 94. Subjects 
scoring from 44 to 65 were delegated to the low-trust 
condition while those scoring from 68 to 94 were delegated 
to the high-trust condition.
The content of the communications was held 
constant by preparing the communications in advance.
Care was taken to insure that the communications contained 
the four minimum ingredients of a cooperative interchange: 
intention, expectation, retaliation and absolution 
(Deutsch, 1958). In addition, the principle of imme­
diacy (Weiner & Mehrabian, 1968) was used in preparing 
the friendly and unfriendly communications. Immediacy 
refers to the different degrees of separation between
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
the speaker and the object she communicates about or the 
addressee of her communication. For example, "we should 
choose black" is more immediate than "you and I should 
choose black", which explicitly maintains separation 
between the communicator and the receiver: therefore, the 
first would make up a friendly communication, whereas 
the second an unfriendly communication. A further indi­
cation of hostility would be, "I shall choose black and 
so should you"* here the separation is intensified by 
the very fact that "I" and "you" are farther apart in the 
sentence and also by the fact that the communicator puts 
selective egocentric emphasis on herself to the exclusion 
of the other person.
The messages were scheduled to take place at 
the beginning of the practice sessions, then immediately 
before the first trial of the game and finally at the end 
of the middle trial of the twenty-trial game. They 
were presented by a confederate (referred to in the experi­
ment as Person B). For the face-to-face condition, the 
confederate participated in the experiment and presented 
the communications in person. For the television commu­
nication condition, the prepared statements were video­
tape recorded and presented to the subjects during the 
experiment. For the telephone condition, tape recordings 
were simultaneously taken with the videotapes and were
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played through a telephone system. For the written 
communication condition, the same prepared statements 
were written and the message passed to the subjects.
As a result of this pre-recording procedure, the experi­
menter was able to run these three latter experimental 
communication conditions without the confederate's 
actually being present.
As a result of the standardized communications, 
the game-playing behavior of the confederate during the 
experiment was also predetermined. Consistent with the 
content of the communications, the investigator programmed 
the confederate to start with a cooperative response 
and to match on each trial the subject's previous response.
Since Deutsch (1958) noted that communication 
effects are observed only when subjects are given an indi­
vidualistic orientation, the instructions included a 
section designed to produce an individualistic set in 
the subjects. They were told that the point of the 
experiment was to earn as much as they could for them­
selves, and not to be concerned about what happened to 
the other person, within this individualistic orientation, 
the subjects were free to decide whether they could win 
more by cooperating or by competing with the other person. 
To further promote this individualistic set, the experi­
menter gave the subjects feedback regarding only their own 
cumulative outcome. This prevented the subjects from
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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comparing their progress with that of the other person, 
which is one aspect of the PD situation which promotes 
a competitive atmosphere. In addition, the instructions 
were made deliberately neutral, using no terms suggesting 
cooperation, conflict or competition. The subjects 
were told simply: "...you and person B stand a chance
of earning money today, but how much you gain will depend 
on what you do and what the other person does."
Procedure
The experimenter escorted the subject into a 
room and seated her at a desk, adjacent to a one-way 
mirror, on which were an identification letter (A), 
a wooden block and the PD matrix (see Appendix B). A 
television monitor or a telephone were also on the desk 
for the television or the telephone communication 
conditions. The experimenter explained that the other 
subject was in a second room and that during the experiment 
the investigator would station himself in the adjacent 
observation room from which he could view both subjects 
through a one-way glass. The experimenter then withdrew 
to the observation room and turned on the tape recorded 
instructions of the experiment and explanation of the PD 
game (see Appendix E). At one point during the tape, 
the experimenter stopped the tape: he entered the experi­
mental room and gave the subject practice so that all 
payoff contingencies were illustrated. After the subject
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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had demonstrated her ability to state the outcome for all 
four payoff contingencies, the experimenter returned to 
the observation room and played the remaining portion of 
the instructions. When the instructions had finished, 
the experimenter signalled by means of an intercom the 
beginning of the experiment, indicating to the subject 
that the first few trials would be practice trials to 
familiarize them with the experimental procedure and would 
not count toward their earnings.
Face-to-face communication. The experimenter 
announced the first communication. After a minute 
31 preparation interval" where the subject was led to 
believe that the other subject was preparing her commu­
nication, the experimenter directed the confederate 
into the experimental room and withdrew. The confe­
derate seated herself before the subject and performed 
the first prepared communication (see Appendix F, part 1) 
in either a friendly or an unfriendly fashion, depending 
on the particular affect condition. Then the confederate 
left the experimental room and, after a short pause, the 
experimenter informed the subjects (that is, the real 
subject and the confederate) to make their first practice 
choice. The subject indicated her choice by placing 
a block on either the solid black circle or the solid 
red circle. After she had placed her block, the experi-
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menter announced both her outcome and the the confede­
rate 's outcome, contingent upon her choice and the pre­
determined confederate cooperative response: "Person A
gets ___; person B gets  __". Then he announced person
A's cumulative outcome: "Person A now has  cents".
After a short pause during which the subject was led to 
believe that the experimenter was giving person B her 
cumulative outcome, the experimenter informed the subjects 
to remove their blocks. After five such trials, during 
which the experimenter programmed the confederate's 
response according to the subject's previous response, 
the experimenter indicated that the real experiment was 
about to begin. Then he announced the second communi­
cation and asked the subject to give the other person 
a few moments to prepare her communication. He then 
directed the confederate into the experimental room 
for the second prepared communication (Appendix P, 
part 2) and withdrew: again, the confederate presented 
either the friendly or the unfriendly communication, 
consistent with how she had presented the first commu­
nication. When the confederate had left the experimental 
room after the communication, the experimenter informed 
the subjects to make their first game choice. The 
experimenter announced the outcome of that trial in terms 
of the confederate's predetermined cooperative response 
and the subject's choice. The succeeding trials were
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played according to the predetermined contingency set 
up for the confederate. Feedback again was provided on 
a single trial basis and cumulatively over trials. At 
the end of the tenth trial, the experimenter announced 
the third communication and, after a minute pause, directed 
the confederate into the experimental room once again.
After this final communication, which was selected from 
a pool of four versions according to the preceding behavior 
of the subject, (Appendix F, part 3a, b, c and d) the 
confederate withdrew and the experimenter continued the 
experiment for ten more trials as before. Then the experi­
menter entered the experimental room with a cops^  of the 
semantic differential rating scales and instructed the 
subject to give her candid impressions of the other person, 
of the experiment and of the messages. Then the experi­
menter withdrew into the observation room. When the subject 
had completed the scale, the experimenter entered the 
experimental room, and debriefed the subjects as to the 
nature of the experiment. Then he invited the subject to ask 
any questions pertaining to the experiment, which he 
answered frankly. The experimenter then payed the subject 
in accordance to her accumulated outcomes and dismissed 
her, asking her not to reveal the purpose and nature of the 
experiment.
Television communication, The experimenter
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followed the same procedure as above: except in these 
conditions, he played the pre-recorded videotapes 
through the television monitor to communicate the three 
messages.
Telephone communication. The experimenter 
adhered to the same procedure with the exception that 
the three messages were transmitted via a telephone 
system.
Written communication. Again the same proce­
dure was followed except that the three communications 
were presented by means of written messages. Consistent 
with real life situations, subjects in this condition 
retained the notes and could refer to them at any time 
in the course of the experiment.
No communication. No explicit communication 
was allowed in this condition. As a result, the subjects 
were not required to rate the messages at the end of the 
experiment.
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RESULTS,
This section deals first with a description of 
the dependent measures in this experiment and then 
with analyses carried out on the performance measures 
and on the post-experimental ratings.
Dependent Measures
Game performance in this experiment was measured 
by means of choices and cents payoff, for the choice 
performance measures, the practice session included five 
choices while the game sessions included twenty choices; 
data analyses were performed on these measures by scoring 
black choices (cooperative choices) 1 and red choices 
(competitive choices) 0. The payoff data consisted of 
the subjects' hypothetical earnings over the practice 
trials and of their actual "take-home" earnings over 
the twenty experimental trials.
When the choice and payoff performance measures 
were correlated over all twanty-five trials, a very high 
correlation of .97 between the two measures resulted. 
However, when the twenty-five trials were broken down 
into one five-trial practice block and two ten-trial 
experimental blocks, this correlation dropped to a v e r y  
low .61 for the practice block, rose to .93 for experi­
mental block 1 and declined again to .85 for experimental 
block 2. These lower correlations within blocks justify 
treating the choice and payoff performance measures as 
two separate dependent variables in this study.
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For each of these choice and payoff dependent 
variables, a correlation was computed between performance 
in the practice session and subsequent performance in 
the game. Although, as seen in Table 1, there appears 
to be some relationship between practice performance and 
game performance for both dependent measures, the corre­
lation between the two performances was only a moderate 
.59 for the choice measure and a relatively low .25 for 
the payoff measure. This supports our initial assumption 
that the practice trials only allowed the subjects to 
familiarize themselves with the game and with the 
experimental procedure: therefore, these practice data 
were omitted from most of the data analyses.
Comparison between Conditions on Choice and Payoff 
Performance Measures
Comparison between controls and experiiaentals 
Table 2 presents multivariate analyses of variance showing 
the differential effects of conditions on mean choices 
and mean payoffs for the friendly and unfriendly expe­
rimental and control conditions over twenty game trials. 
The conditions variable consisted of a comparison 
between the control condition and each of the eight 
communication-by-affeet conditions. With regards to the 
conditions variable, these analyses yielded significant 
differences between the control condition and each experi-
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TABLE 1
Percent cooperative choices and mean payoffs on the twenty experimental 
trials as s t function of the number of cooperative choices on the five
practice trials
Number of 
cooperative 
choices on 
practice 
trials
R Percent cooperative choices j Mean Payoff
!5 practice 
; trials
| 20 experimental | 
j trials ]
I *
. 1 . . 1
5 practice 
trials
f 20 experiments] 
\ trials
Rone a 1 0
y 1
I 100.0 f
5 I
9.0 I 60.0
One 3 20
:
i 3i.6 j 12.0 j 37.7
Two 11
5
40 ! 4 7 .3 | 12.5 44.4
Three 12 60 1 74.2 |
f |
14.8 52.8
Pour 6 80 j 79.2 15.0 54.0
Five 21 100 ! 93-x |
15.0 58.7
a Note that this represents only one case where the subject competed 
during the practice trials but cooperated during the experimental 
trials.
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TABLE 2
Multivariate and univariate analyses of variance on choice and payoff performar
Comparison of 
Controls with
Eace-to-face
Conditions (C) 
Blochs (B)
C x B
Television
Conditions (C) 
Blocks (B)
C x B
Telephone
Conditions (C) 
Blocks (B)
C x B
Written
Conditions (C) 
Blocks (B)
C x B
Multivariate Analysis of Variance
Choice and
Friendly Unfriendly Frier
2,9
2,9
l
2,Q
16.05 | <.005|14.18
20.18 < .0 0 1 1 6.80
12.02 \ <..005! 1.18
6.11 j ^.025 7.98
< .005
^.025
ns
<.01
| 1,10 (32.51 j
} 1,10 ] 0.00 j 
! 1,10 | 4.12 j
f 1,10 I 33.65
| 1,10 j 0.43
I 1,10 j .6,16
i
1.10 J25.25
1.10 j _0.27
1.10 j 3.58
.10 j13.11
10 | 4.10
>10 0.66
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payoff performance measures of controls and experimentals for twenty game trials
Univariate Analyses of Variance
df Choice
T?ri endXy TJhirTendTy*
f:
Is
f
11,10 ] 1,10 
i i»io 
f
p
[32, 
| 0, 
1 4,
! 1,10 f 33.
10
I 1:10 | 25.
! 1 -10
'
I 1,10 \ 3
i
11-10 j13. 
|1.10 | 4,
jiao | o,
p
51
00
12
65
43
16
25
27
56
11
10
66
i C
< .001 
ns 
< .10
.001
ns
.05
| <.001
I ns j <10
!
{ <.005
I ^.10
{ ns
J31.01 
< 0.84 
1-1 *50
14.04 
j 0.29 
1.80
| 2.53
j 0.00
J'5.90
t
I
Il6.02| °'35 
! 2.17
p
.001
ns
ns
< .005 
ns 
ns
Payoff
■priendTy "Unfriendly
P P
22.95
2.60
16.76
21.44
1.57
5.53
< .001 
ns
< .005
24.47
2.98
10.47
i <
.001 |14.98 
ns | 3.22 
.05 1 13.77
< .001 
ns 
< .01
< .005 
ns 
<.005
ns S 19.18 !
?
< .005 ! £
3
2.08 j ns
ns j 4.09 4a
OH7
2.65 | . ns
05 j 11.91
s
i
A
i
.01 ii 1.57 j ns
i < .005 13.31 * .005 j 11.85 J 1—1O•V
i ns 10.53 ^.01 5.61 ( <.05
ns 1.63 ns j lv 93 ns
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mental condition, except the telephone-unfriendly condi­
tion.
In order to isolate the sources of these signi­
ficant differences, separate univariate analyses, comparing 
the controls with each experimental condition, were 
performed on the choice and payoff data. For these 
univariate analyses, it was possible to include within- 
subject blocks effects for the first ten and the last 
ten trials. Again, Table 2 points out the striking finding 
that, with the important exception of the telephone- 
unfriendly condition, during the game, the subjects in 
all communication conditions performed significantly 
more cooperatively and earned significantly greater payoffs 
than the control subjects. Table 3, which summarizes the 
mean score on both performence measures for each condition, 
confirms the analysis of Table 2.
The preponderance of cooperation among communi­
cation conditions was further accentuated by three facts. 
First, as shown in Table 3, the experimentals on the whole 
chose the black cooperative strategy a mean of 16.04 
times during the game, while the controls chose black only 
6.17 times. Similarly, experimental subjects received 
an average of 54-6 cents as compared to the 38.17 cents 
earned by the controls. These differences were significant 
both for choices (F:=;28.93, df = l;53? P<-.001) and payoffs
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TABLE 3
Lean cooperative clioiees and mean payoff for control and commtuaication aonditioi
ommuni cation! 
ondition j
Mean cooperative choices j
1
Mean payoff in cents
jFriendfyjhis — —^- i—
Unfriendly NjCombined N |Friend]y|N 'Unfriendly
'i i ; 5-|
Combined N..
1
ace-to-face j 17.17j6 17.83 ;6| 17.50
(
12; 57.33 ;6 j 57.50
1
6| 57.42 12
elevision I 18.00 |6 15.83 6j 16.92 12| 56.83 16 | 55.33 6 i 56.08 12
elephone \ 17.33 |6 10.50 j6 \ 13.92j 12! 56.33 [6 | 45.17 6 f 50.75 !12
ritten \ 16.50 !6 15.17 I6 I 15.84 12: 55.33 |6 1i 'i 53.00 6! 54.17 12
ombined 1\ 17.25 lia 14.83 [i;| 16.04 24i 56.46 il2f 52.75 I2f 54.60 |24
o communi- \ !j s \ I i i j (
cation |
!t
j
)
&j
I 6.173t
|
6 I
f
1
Ii!
38.17 |
f
s
6
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( F ~ 32.05, df-1, 53, P< .001). Second, 37 percent of 
the experimental subjects chose nothing but the cooperative 
black strategy all the way through the experiment; none 
consistently chose red. In contrast, none of the control 
subjects consistently cooperated, but one control chose 
the red competitive strategy all the way through.
Third, 62.5 percent of the experimental exhibited a 
cooperative lockin, that is, cooperation on at least 
nine of the final ten trials (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; 
Wichman, 1970), whereas none of the controls did. In 
contrast, 33.3 percent of the controls exhibited a 
competitive lockin, that is, competition on at least 
nine of the final ten trials, whereas no experimental 
subject locked in a competitive strategy.
Comparison between four communication, two affect 
and two trust levels. Table 4 presents a multivariate 
analysis of variance showing the effect of four levels 
of communication, two levels of affect and two levels of 
trust upon mean choices and mean outcomes for twenty 
game trials. This analysis yielded significant differences 
between communication conditions (F r2.31, df - 6,62 E< .05) 
and between affect conditions (F= 2,83, df-2,31, P^ .10) 
which may be attributed to the significant interaction 
between communication and affect (F-2.31, df— 6,62,
P <-.05). ho effects of trust were noted and this variable
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TABiiE 4
Multivariate and univariate analyses of variance on choice and payoff 
performance measures for twenty game trials
----------------------------------------... - -----  ;----------------------------------------5------------------ ----------------
Source of f Multivariate § Univariate | Univariate
Variance I Choices and Payoffs I Choices 1 Payoffs
----------- -----— "jf :• f ~ — ~r~ iZHZJZZZTnZ
Communication. ( C)1 6 ’
62 i) 2 .31 .05
;
i 3 ? 32
!■
I 2-11
■i
i
1 ns5
1 1 
|3,32j 3.51 ? .05
Affect(A) | 2.31 jI 2 .83 i
.10 a ,32 I 4 *97 f .05t
i 5
1.32 31 i 5.75 I ,05
Trust(T) * 2 31 tf:j,
0 .56 ns jl,32 j 0.02 j ns
1 3 
11,32]
j i
0.02 I ns
Blocks(B) \ —
1
i •— I1’32 { 6.18 j.02|^ 3 2  i 0.52 | ns
C X A 1 6,f. 62
ItIk>J.'
2 .31 I .05
j 3,32 1 2.14 [ nss |3,32 j> 3
2.70 | .10
C X T \ 6’62 0 .72
•j ns j3,32 | 0.84 1 nsi (3,32 j 0.98
s
1 ns"i
A X T 1 2,31 ,(i-.
1..30
15 ns U . s j 0.38 ! ns|
;i,32j< } 0.99 1 ns
C X B |
Js
$ — . 3,32 j 0.86 ! ns
j b»32 f'» -5
1.32 | ns
A X B
i
V
t
J
— [ 1.32 j 0,19
i? ns ] 1 , 3 2 \ 0.07 ! ns
T X B ! - I94
— i 1,32 j 0.09
i
1 ns
s.
M 2 j 0.01 | ns
C X A x T 6>
62 I 1 . 14 i1
5
ns 1 3,32 1 2.34 |-10 |3,32.j 2.38 1 .10
C X A x B
|5
1 . — ! 3,32 \ 1.09
jj ns
j
|3,32j 0.18 ns
n
U X T x B - - I —
t
i
\
— 3,32 jr 0.64 ] ns ;3,32 j 0.22
;
ns
■
A X T x B - -
:
— 1,32 j 0.77 ) ns *1,32 | 1.21
i
ns
C X A x T x B - -
1
— — 3,32 j 1.27 | ns 3,32 I 
1
0.72 ns
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will be omitted from further analyses of choices and 
payoffs.
In order to isolate the sources of the significant 
differences obtained from the multivariate analysis, 
separate univariate analyses were performed on choices 
and payoffs. Again, it was possible to include within- 
subject blocks effects for the first ten and the last 
ten trials in these univariate analyses.
Table 4 suggests that the significant communi­
cation effect noted in the multivariate analysis may be 
attributed more to payoff scores than to the choice 
measures. When the payoff means for the four experi­
mental conditions were subjected to Duncan’s Multiple 
Range test, the mean payoff of 50.75 cents to subjects 
in the telephone condition was found significantly lower 
than the 57-42 cents of subjects in the face-to-face and 
the 56.08 cents of subjects in the television communication 
conditions (!P<.05); subjects in the written condition 
earned a mean of 54.17 cents, which was not significantly 
different from any other mean. These data are presented 
in Table 3* However, these results must be interpreted 
in light of the communication-by-affect interaction 
observed in Table 4 for the payoff measure. When the 
mean payoffs of the eight various communication-by-affect 
conditions were subjected to Duncan's Multiple Range 
test, the mean payoff of 45.17 cents to subjects in the
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telephone-unfriendly condition was found to be signifi­
cantly lower than the mean payoffs of each other commu­
nication condition which, as seen from Table 3, ranged 
from 53.00 cents to 57.50 cents; these differences were 
significant at the 1 percent level for all the communi­
cation conditions, except for the written-friendly, 
written-unfriendly and telephone-unfriendly conditions 
where the difference was significant at the 5 percent 
level, ho other significant differences emerged from 
the Duncan test.
Although no communication or communication-by- 
affect effects were noted for the choice performance 
measure in Table 4, these approached significance at the 
10 percent level: therefore, as for the payoff means, the 
choice means for the four communication conditions were 
compared by means of Duncan's Multiple Range test. 
Similarly, this test showed that the 13-9 cooperative 
choices of the subjects in the telephone condition was 
significantly lower than the 17.5 of subjects in the 
face-to-face and the 16.9 of subjects in the television 
conditions (p<.05): subjects in the written condition 
played a mean of 15.84 cooperative choices, which was 
not significantly different from any other mean. Again, 
these data are presented in Table 3- And again, since 
the communication-by-affect interaction for choices
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approached significance at the 10 percent level, another 
Duncan Multiple Range test was performed on the mean 
cooperative choices of the eight communication-by-affect 
conditions. As in the equivalent Duncan test performed 
on payoffs, the subjects in the telephone-unfriendly 
condition chose a mere 10.5 black cooperative choices, 
compared to the other experimental conditions which 
exhibited from 15.17 to 18.00 black choices, as seen from 
Table 3: these differences were significant at the 1 
percent level for all communication conditions, except 
for the written-unfriendly condition where the difference 
was significant at the 5 percent level.
Table 4 also shows that there was a significant 
difference between the friendly and unfriendly conditions 
for both choice and payoff performance measures (P-c.05). 
Referring back to Table 3, subjects interacting with a 
friendly confederate chose a mean of 17.25 black choices 
during the game while those interacting with a hostile 
confederate chose a mean of 14*83 black choices.
Similarly, subjects in the friendly condition earned a 
mean of 56.46 cents as compared to the 52.75 cents 
earned by those in the unfriendly condition. Again these 
differences must be interpreted in light of the communi- 
cation-by-affect interaction. Friendly choices and payoffs 
exceeded unfriendly in each communication condition,
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except for the face-to-face condition which saw a slight 
increase in cooperative choices and payoffs in the unfriendly 
condition as compared to the friendly condition. However, 
as noted in the two previous Duncan tests performed on 
the eight communication-by-affect conditions, it was in the 
telephone condition that subjects in the unfriendly condi­
tion made significantly fewer cooperative responses and 
earned substantially lower payoffs than their counterparts 
in the friendly condition (Pc .01).
Blocks effects. Finally, as mentioned previously, 
the twenty game trials were broken down into two blocks of 
ten trials each in order to present some picture of the 
trends in cooperation and payoffs from the first to the 
second half of the game.
Tables 2 and 4 both included blocks effects in 
their analyses. Because this measure is a within-subject 
variable, it C/ould not be subjected to a multivariate 
analysis of variance. However, when blocks were included 
in the univariate analyses performed on choices and payoffs, 
a number of significant results appeared.
First, Table 2, which presents the comparison 
between the controls and each of the communication-by- 
affect conditions for twenty game trials, reveals signi­
ficant communication-by-block interactions for the analysis 
including the controls and all the friendly communication 
conditions except the written condition for both choices and 
payoffs. These interactions are also significant in the
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unfriendly condition for the telephone communication 
(choices only) and the face-to-face and television condi­
tions (Payoffs only). In each interaction the performance 
measure rose from the first to the second block forrthe 
communication condition while it fell for the control 
condition. Note that only in the written communication 
condition was there not a sufficient increase in perfor­
mance from the first to the second block to result in a 
communication-by-blocks interaction.
Bote also from Table 2 the significant main blocks 
effects for choices in the^friendly condition and for 
both choices and payoffs in the -unfriendly condition.
When blocks were included in the univariate analyses 
performed for the various communication conditions on 
choices and payoffs for the twenty game trials (see Table 4), 
a significant blocks effect appeared for the choice perfor­
mance measure (F-6.18, df~l,32, Pc .025); the mean 
number of cooperative choices increased from 7.67 in the 
first half of the game to 8.38 in the second half.
Following this lead, all twenty-five trials, 
including the practice trials, were broken down further 
into blocks of five in order to study the short- and long­
term effects of each communication on cooperative choices 
and payoffs. Table 5 summarizes these data which are 
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 for choices and payoffs 
respectively: the control curve has been included in these 
graphs for comparison purposes.
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TABLE 5
Summary of percent cooperative choices and mean payoffs over five five- 
trial blocks for communication and control conditions
Communication
Condition
Percent cooperative choices | Mean Mock payoffs 
BlbckBBIock}Mocm;Block .bibcklBIoek* Block. Slock; block 
1 2 ' ' 3 : 4 -  : 5 1 2 3 4
Block"
5
Overall :a 
face-to-face 
Television 
Telephone 
Written 
Mean
87 ! 83 1 85 j 95 I 87 ;14.67 !14.33 *13 • 65 114.68 14.74
72 | 85 i 72 J 90 I 92
I * ‘ 1
[13.76 ]14.16|13.26 (13.43 115.25
64 I 72 j 58 I 78 i 70 |l4.00113.66111.60 513.00 ?12.50
73 j 80 { 78 j 82 i 77 ji4.6Oji4.i5j.i3.6O 12.93 ;13.50
“74 i "80 j *74 86 ; 82 114.25 14.08 13.02 jl3.5l <14.00
friendly:
face-to-face
Television
Telephone
Written
Mean
b
Unfriendly:
face-to-face
Television
Telephone
Written
Mean
b
Control
a N - 1 2
83 f 80 j 80 } 90 93 [14-50 ;14.15 i!3.65 14 35 15 15
73 1 90 70 1100 ? 100 113.67 14.17 :i3.67 14 .00 15 .00
80 1 93. 73 j 90 j 90 115.35 ;i5.17•12 .50 15 .00 13 .65
63 1 87 83 j 80 1 80 : !3 .85 |14.15 ■14.35 12 .85 514.00
75 j 88 77 j 901
•j
:■ 91 ;!4• 34 j14
1—1 • 13 .54 14 05 114
I
.45
90 j 87 90 j 100 80 14.83 14.50 13 65 15 .00m • 33
70 1 80 73 \ 80 : 83 ,13.85 14 .15 12 85 12 .85 U5 • 50
47 ; 50 43 ! 67 50 12 . 65 12 .15 10 .70 11 .00in .35
83 ! 73 73 I S3 : 73 15 -35 14 .15 12 85 13 .00ii3 .00
73 | 72 70 j 82
i
72 J 1 4 .17 13 .74 12 .51 12 .96jlj
£
.55
43 ! 37
1
37
17
33
i13
.17 11.00 10 00 8.50
1
1 9 1
.00
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Multivariate analyses, comparing controls with 
experimentals for each of the five blocks (see fable 6) 
show significant differences for all conditions in Blocks 
2 and 4, immediately after the second and third communica­
tions, except for the telephone-unfriendly condition.
These differences were maintained in Block 5, again 
except for the telephone-unfriendly condition.
Evidently, communication has a marked effect on 
choices, figures 1(a), (b) and (c)— for combined friendly 
and unfriendly conditions, friendly conditions and un­
friendly conditions, respectively— show first that for each 
communication condition, regardless of channel, the origi­
nal pre-practice communication produces a higher level of 
cooperative choices in Block 1 (practice), as compared to 
the control condition. This difference is significant for 
each experimental condition, with the exception of the 
television-unfriendly, telephone-unfriendly and written- 
friendly conditions: this can be seen in Table 6.
Univariate analyses of variance on the five-trial 
block data for the communication conditions yielded signi­
ficant blocks effects for choices (F =-3.88, df-4, 128, 
Pk.01). Thus, as seen in Figures 1(a), (b) and (c), the 
pattern over the remainder of the game for the experimental 
conditions is as follows. After the second communication, 
cooperation increased still further in Block 2, but fell
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TABLE 6
altivariate and univariate analyses of variance on choice and payoff p 
measures of controls and experimentals for five blocks of five trial
__ ...."""ltd
U n i v a r i a t e  A n a l y s
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* 5 i j Block 1 j Block 2 j Block 3 ! Block 4 ' Block 5
p i i F ] P i F 1i < P |f | p j F P f F 1 P1 . ... i......
> i] i 
| .005 ! i, 10 !
i c
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1
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i —  — ij V
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j 1 I
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i 1
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i .I }
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.01 
.OH
.01
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to about Block 1 level in Block 3. After the third commu­
nication, cooperation rose in Block 4 to a higher point 
than its previous peak in Block 2. Then, in Block 5, 
cooperation rose slightly more for the friendly condition 
but fell for the unfriendly condition. Indeed, when the 
difference between the first four blocks added together 
and Block 5 for the friendly condition was compared to this 
difference for the unfriendly condition, the difference 
between the differences was significant at the 5 percent 
level for a one-tailed t-test (t = 1.74, df- 46, E« .05).
This pattern of the communication conditions 
across the five blocks receives support from Duncan’s 
Multiple Range tests which were performed on the mean 
number of cooperative choices per block for the combined 
communication conditions, for the friendly conditions and 
for the unfriendly conditions. Bor the combined conditions, 
cooperation in Block 4— the one immediately after the third 
communication— was significantly higher than cooperation 
in each of Blocks 1 and 3 (? <-.05). Bor the friendly 
conditions, cooperation in each of Blocks 4 and 5 were 
significantly higher than in Blocks 1 and 3 (P<.05): 
and cooperation in Block 2 was significantly higher than 
in Block 1 (P ^ .05). And finally, for the unfriendly 
condition, cooperation in Block 4 was significantly higher 
than cooperation in Block 3 (P <-05).
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The control curve reveals a pattern noticeably 
different from the experimental curve; it not only shows 
the control group starting at a strikingly lower level 
of cooperation, but also decreasing even more across 
Blocks 2, 3 and 4, and recovering only slightly in 
Block 5. This supports the previous observation with respect 
to the communication-by-blocks interactions which were 
characterized by the communication conditions’ showing 
increases in cooperation from the first to the second 
half of the game and the control condition's showing a 
decrease.
The univariate analyses of variance for payoffs 
performed on the five-trial block data for the communi­
cation conditions also yielded a significant blocks 
effect (B-2.94, dfv 4,128, pz_.025). Figures 2(a),
(b) and (c) present the graphs for the mean payoffs 
per five-trial block.
Again, on the first block, subjects in the commu­
nication conditions earned more than subjects in the 
control condition. However, Table 6 shows that this 
time only three of eight commuication conditions—  
telephone-friendly, face-to-face-unfriendly and written- 
unfriendly— showed significant differences.
The pattern of the payoff curves deviates slightly 
from that of the choice curves. The payoff curves do
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not show a payoff increase after each communication, 
corresponding to the increase in cooperation after 
each communication. In effect, there is a decrease in 
payoffs after the second communication. However, consistent 
with the increase in cooperation after the third communi­
cation, for the combined conditions, the payoff measure 
also showed an increase. Again, as for the choice measure, 
the difference between the first four blocks added together 
and Block 5 was larger for the friendly condition than it 
was for the unfriendly condition (t~1.62, df=-46, P^.IO).
However, these trends for the payoff measures 
are not as obvious as those for the choice measures; 
this is indicated by the fact that Duncan1s Range test 
failed to show that the blocks following the second and 
third communication differed significantly from any other 
block. This test did show, however, that for the 
combined communication conditions subjects earned signi­
ficantly less in Block 3 than in either of Blocks 1, 2 
or 5. This can be attributed more to the unfriendly 
conditions than the friendly conditions, since it is in 
the former that similar differences emerged.
This discrepancy between the effects of the 
independent variables upon the two performance measures 
justifies the initial contention that the two measures 
must be treated as separate dependent variables. This
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discrepancy may be explained, at least in part, by the 
fact that four separate versions of the third communi­
cation were available to subjects during the experiment, 
each contingent upon the behavior of the subjects on 
the previous trials. Communication 3(a) was presented 
when the subject cooperated on all ten previous game 
trials: communication 3(b) when she failed to cooperate 
on all previous trials, but cooperated on the latter 
two trials: communication 3(c) when the subject chose 
the competitive red strategy on the last trial; and finally 
communication 3(d) when the subject chose the cooperative 
black strategy on the last trial and the confederate 
chose the competitive red strategy. The first version 
of the third communication was elicited by 22 subjects, 
the second by 10 subjects, the third by 10 subjects and 
the fourth by 6 subjects. Figure 3 which compares, for 
each version, performance across five five-trial blocks 
shows, for the first, second and fourth versions, a 
pattern similar for both choices (Figure a) and payoffs 
(Figure b). The graph for the first version shows little 
difference between the blocks: that is, all blocks are 
consistently high for both choices andpayoffs. The 
diagrams for the second version show a decrease in choice 
and payoffs from Block 2 to Block 3; then after the 
communication 3(b), both choices and payoffs increased
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for Block 4 and remained rather stable. The diagrams 
for the fourth version show a decrease in choices and 
payoffs from Block 2 to Block 3; then after communication 
3(d), both choices and payoffs increased for Block 4 
and then decreased for Block 5.
However, contrary to these consistent patterns 
for choices and'payoffs, there is a dramatic deviation in 
this pattern for communication 3(c). First, the choice 
measure shows a decrease from Block 2 to Block 3, whereas 
the payoff measure remains stable. Then, and most impor­
tant, after communication 3(c), choices increased from 
Block 3 to 4 whereas payoffs decreased. This phenomenon 
in Block 4 was due to the nature of the third version, 
such that the confederate called for the subject to play 
black when she herself would play red; this meant of 
course that the subject, by cooperating would lose 
money; but this move was required if the two partners 
were to embark upon a cooperative relationship; and this 
they tended to do, as indicated by the fact that payoffs 
increased for Block 5.
In brief, therefore, the fact thai^  for the third 
version of the third communication, cooperative choices 
may increase while payoffs decrease accounts for the 
discrepancy often noted between the effects of the 
independent variables upon the two performance measures.
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Post-experimental Bating Scales
A factor analysis on the items of each of the 
three post-experimental rating scales was performed by 
first inter-correlating the items in the rating scale 
and by then performing a principal components analysis 
and a varimax rotation of principal components with 
eigenvalues greater than 1.
Pactors of "Other person" scale, Table 7 
presents the correlation matrix and Table 8 the factor 
matrix for the "Other person" semantic differential 
rating scale. Six factors emerged from the principal 
components analysis.
factor (OP)I loaded highest on pleasant-unpleasant, 
friendly-unfriendly, admirable-contemptible, altruistic- 
egotistic, unselfish-selfish and good-bad, in the order 
given; these reflect a Pleasantness-Priendliness factor.
It is evident, from the high intercorrelations among 
these items in Table 7, that the subjects consistently 
viewed the confederate as being either friendly or un­
friendly.
factor (OP)II loaded highest on controlling- 
unconstraining, aggressive-meek, active-passive, dynamic- 
subdued and domineering-submissive, in that order; these 
reflect a Control-Aggression-Activity factor. Thus, 
subjects consistently perceived an element of direction
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3,'tins' s<Intercorrelations of items in "Other person" semantic differential
¥
Adjective pairs \ 
* \
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 pleasant-unpleasant j
2 friendly-unfriendly \ 82
3 admirable-contemptible j 70 66
4
i
altruistic-egotistic j 50 35 50
5 unselfish-selfish 1 74 76 76 45
6 good-bad 56 52 70 56 72
7 controlling-unconstrainingj -33--31--27 3--36-10
8 aggressive-meek j-46-45--50--19--54--39 52
9
i
active-passive j -18--15--15--10--18--21 47 52
10 dynamic-subdued ; 12 08--05 24--09--07 28 39 50
11..domineering^submissive j
iI
-52--45--43--42--55--37 53 54 42 07
12 fair-unfair | 41 26 50 36 53 54 -17--34 47 02 -35
13
\
objective-biased | 31 14 27 35 44 43 00--23--02 -07 -18 60
14 trustworthy-tricky | 28 18 33 13 46 41 -20--29--11 00 -27 44 40
15 cooperative-competitive j 39 44 45 33 56 53 -15--38--22 09 -41 68 43
16 credible-suspicious ! 46 45 43 34 53 56 -22--27 05 29 -34 47 34{
17 skillful-unskillful 16 19 43 13 29 36 -08 10 17 14 -09 19 13
18 clever-stupid 12 09
42 21 31 20 01-01 10 07 -16 14 17
19 expert-ignorant | 20 15 30 27 32 31 -15-11 15 11 -11 08 30
20 competent-incompetent 1113 12 34 16 30 37 -06-20 16 04 00 36 32
i
21 experienced-inexperienced 10 07 09 15. 06 04 11 11 37 36 -Of
22 persuasive-unpersuasive 53 36 34 30 35 44 -03-05 23 35 -:u
9Q 31
23 assuring-unassuring 54 46 40 17 57 50 -37-31--10 -03 - ■■: ■r9
34
24 strong-weak -28--24--27--08--27--18 -09 55 49 41
- 2 0 -15
25 shrewd-dull 35 25 31 18 27 09 -09-03 21 31
18 04
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4 6
ifferential -rating s0al8 (H = 48)
9 10 21 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
2
9 50
4 42 07
4 47 ©2 -35
3-02 -07 -18 60
9-11 00 -27 44 40
8-22 09 -41 68 43 58
7 05 29 -34 47 34 45 33
0 17 14 -0° 19 13 12 14 08
1 10 07 -16 14 17 28 19 11 50
1 15 11 -11 08 30 31 15 27
62 48
0 16 04 OC 36 32 24 28 25 33 41 38
1 37 36 -Of
01 -04 -06 -09 17 36 16 49 13
5 23 35 -.11
29 31 37 17 37 38 02 41 23 32
.1-10 -03 49 34 23
36 57 19 09 18 38 30 45
5 49 41 ' ■
.20 -15 00 -25 00 19 -09 19 13 34 24 -06
i3 21 31
18 04 33 10 36 34 35 32 21 20 32 16
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TABLE 8
Varimax rotations of principal axis solution— "Other person" 
semantic differential rating scale (N — 48)
Adjective pairs
pleasant-unpleasant
friendly-unfriendly
admirable-contemptible
altruistic-egotistic
unselfish-selfish
good-bad
contro11ing-unconstraining
aggressive-meek
active-passive
dynamic-subdued
domineering-submissive
fair-unfair
objective-biased
trustworthy-tricky
cooperative-competitive
credible-suspicious
t r Factors 
HI'? IV % VI
15 12
84j 23 j 181 00 f 20 | 15 
81 i 26 ! 07: 01;i C <
731 21 | 261 397 0  f - 2 0  \ 20 !  14
69| 33 | 41j 23
62| 08 \ 52j 23
i i \
07 |-86 ) 00 j—04
-38 1-69 | -25 j -00 
-15 1-67 1 -07 1 16 
211-59 ! -09 1-05 
-49 1-55 | -13 1-01; £ I
i s I
29j 11 | 79| 02
18 j—06 | 74 j 13
03 j 20 | 70] 13
33i 18 j 68| 07
41 [ 08 I 48 1-06
-03 I 0 6  
-02 | 01 
07 ( 08 
10 j -16
i
-24 | -15 
13 [ 10 
37 j 18 
34 | 46 
01 -22
01 05
05 | -18
-03
-18
34
45
11
33
skillful-unskillful ! 17 b 05 1 02  1 79 ! 24( 05
clever-stupid 1 13 5-04 5 111 79
i
1 -25 24
expert-ignorant 1 10 i 04 -S j e 0.3 j 75 ! 34 09
competent-incompetent \ 00 1-01 1
1 j \
48 j 51 j 19 -08
experienced-inexperienced f 071-06 j5 [ \ -18 | 36< I 70t 05
persuasive-unpersuasive j 37 |~16 j 29 | 11 \ 60
7
13
assuring-unassuring | 31 | 35 I3 f £
46 j 02 | 55 -05
strong-weak ! -37 j—34 j
t !
i o CO o 1 53
|
j 12
38
shrewd-dull
i i jj 19 j—03 J
}
06 j 30 78
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in the other person (see Table 7); this is not surprising 
in view of the fact that the other person, by being 
assigned the communicator's role in this one-way commu­
nication situation, was in control of the situation.
factor (OP)III loaded highest on fair-unfair, 
objective-biased, trustworthy-tricky, cooperative-competi­
tive and credible-suspicious, in that order; thus, these 
reflect a Fairness-Trustworthiness-Cooperativeness 
factor. Therefore, when the confederate was perceived 
as being fair, she was rated more trustworthy and more 
cooperative.
Factor (OP)IV loaded highest on skillful-unskill­
ful, clever-stupid, expert-ignorant and competent-incom­
petent, in that order; these reflect a Skillfulness- 
Cleverness factor. This indicates that an element of skill 
arises in the subjects' perceptions of the other person 
as they interact with her in a Prisoner's Dilemma situation.
Factor (0P)V loaded highest on experienced- 
inexperienced, persuasive-unpersuasive, assuring-unassur- 
ing and strong-weak, in that order; these reflect an 
Experience-Persuasiveness-Potency factor. The more 
experience a person has, the more persuasive and potent 
is she in her approach in a prisoner's dilemma situation.
Finally, Factor (OP)VI loaded highly on only 
one item, shrewd-dull. This loading, combined with the
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factor's weaker loadings on trustworthy-tricky and 
dynamic-subdued seem to reflect a Quick-wittedness 
factor.
Factors of "Experiment" scale. Table 9 presents 
the correlation matrix and Table 10 the factor matrix 
for the "Experiment" semantic differential rating scale. 
Three factors emerged from the factor analysis.
Factor (EX)I loaded highest on valuable-worthless, 
good-bad, engrossing-tiring, interesting-boring and 
useful-useless, in that order; these reflect an Evaluation- 
Interest factor. That is, the more subjects recognized 
some value in the experiment, the more they were occupied 
with it. In other words, people cannot get involved 
in a task when they consider it menial.
Factor (EX)II loaded highest on genuine-deceitful, 
authentic-fake, real-unreal and honest-dishonest, in 
that order: these reflect a Genuineness-Authenticity 
factor. That is, subjects were consistent in recognizing 
the genuineness or the fakeness of the experiment.
Factor (EX)III loaded most heavily on well- 
executed-poorly-executed and this factor was termed a 
Quality-of-Execution factor.
Factors of "Message" scale. Table 11 presents 
the correlation matrix and Table 12 the factor matrix 
for the "Message" semantic differential rating scale.
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TABliE 9
Intercorrelations of items in "Experiment"
rating scale (S'- 48)
semantic differential
Adjective pairs
1 valuable-worthless
2 good-bad
3 engrossing-tiring
4 interesting-boring
5 useful-useless
6 gehiiine-deceitful
7 authentic-fake
8 real-unreal
9 honest-dishonest
10 well executed-
poorly executed
1 i: 2 |
!
3 \ 4 i 5 j
i
44 1i
I: 4 
I
*
1
i
1
}
39 ! 51 i
r
\ i.
47j 58 !: 70? i
40 j
41 i'\
; 451
i
34 j
17 I 28 1! 28 \ 40; 15 \
33 5 25 j\ 30} 421 221
25 i 38 ji; 42} 63} 291
04 ! 32 }19 s 26! 221
! 01 ! 15 ! 28 111 09!
7 i  8
I 56 I 
58 |
56 | 30
! I 64 I
-01 15
20
13 041
10
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table 10
Varimax rotations of principal axis solution— "Experiment" 
semantic differential rating scale (N^48)
Adjective pairs T
factors
 2— r
valuable-worthle s s i 77 | 04 3-14
good-bad i 72 j 24 j 10
engrossing-tiring I 72 1 2 1 ! 37
int ere s t ing-bo r ing j 71 | 42 | 16
useful-useless 1 6 9  1 07 i7-01
genuine-deceitful 
authentic-fake 
real-unreal 
honest-dishonest
well executed-poorly exectued |
10 90 I -06
22 73 ! 16
36 69 j 20
07 67 I -09]
05 o x
|
| 95
i
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TABLE II
Intercorrelations of items in "Message" semantic differential rating
scale (Nr: 48)
Communication
Ingredient
Adjective pairs
1 Intention
2 Intention
3 Retaliation
communicated-not 
communicated
clear-unclear
communicated-not 
communicated
4 Retaliation ■ clear-unclear
5 Expectation communicated-not 
communicated
6 Expectation i clear-unclear
7 Absolution
8 Absolution
9 Retaliation
10 Absolution
1 j 2
I
3 I 4 | 15  1 6  1 17 18 9 I 10
8 9 1
42i
291
communi cate d-no t 
communicated
clear-unclear
play red-play blank 
play red-play black
t
14j
J
08
-01
06
ocj
50j j j
» I
j t I
52 42 l
i « *
! s !
16| 0^-04}
i ! !
36j 12 OOj
! I i
93!
04; 21 18 02; 06|
-04
20
00'
1$ 18!
22: 40 
-01-16 
f
jI
i
CMOI 031
I
fY-p 
'
cr>
-10
1
-lOf -12-13!
11
13l
-21-22:S !
1 1
-43
See main text and Appendix D fo3 
adjective pairs.
a complete description of the
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TABLE 12
Yarimax rotations of principal axis solution— "Message" semantic 
differential rating scale (N -48)
Communication Adjective pair factors
ingredient I -L 1 11 III N
Intention communicated-not communicated ! 85
i 1 9
04 -10
Intention clear-unclear 1 93 | 19 ;.08 04
Retaliation c ommuni cate d-no t communicated
*
|71 j -04 -18 08
Retaliation clear-unclear j 62
I
j -10 -15 41
Expectation communicated-not communicated
f
j 01 ! 98 01 3 -03
Expectation clear-unclear 1 20
1
96 -28
:
-09
Absolution communicated-not communicated 1 11
J
01 -97 | 02
Absolution clear-unclear | 03 00 -98 04
1
Retaliation j
t
play red-play black \ 22 -08 22 , 84
Retaliation [play red-play black
1
!07
■i
°3 23
■
I
-80
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In these tables, intention refers to the confederate's 
planned strategy of choosing black on the first trial, 
expectation to her anticipation of the subject’s choosing 
black, retaliation to her plan of choosing red on the 
next trial should the subject choose red and absolution 
to her plan of choosing black on the next trial should 
the subject choose black after having chosen red.
Pour factors emerged from the factor analyses of 
these ten items. Factor (MS)I loaded highest on the two 
intention (Partner's Intention) items, communicated- 
not communicated and clear-unclear and on the two 
retaliation (Partner's Intention whenever You Play Red) 
items, communicated-not communicated, clear-unclear; 
these seem to reflect a Clarity-of-Intention factor which 
we shall qualify as being of the first degree— the reasons 
for which will be made apparent later. It is reasonable 
for these items to cluster together since there is some 
relationship between the confederate's intention on the 
first trial and her intention should the subject choose 
red.
Factor (MS)II loaded highest on the two expectation 
(Partner's Expectation of You) items, communicated- 
not communicated, and clear-unclear! these reflect a 
Clarity-of-Expectation factor. Evidently intention.is 
distinct from expectation.
Factor (MS)III loaded most heavily on the two
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absolution (Partner's Intention whenever You Play Black 
after Having Played Red) items, communicated-not communi­
cated and clear-unclear; these reflect a Clarity-of- 
Intention factor which we shall qualify as being of the 
second degree so as to distinguish it from factor (MS)I 
which we have already called Clarity-of-Intention—  
first degree. The second degree factor differs from the 
first in that it involves a greater degree of contingency 
(that is, "partner's intention whenever you play black 
after having played red" involves two previous responses, 
whereas "partner's intention whenever you play red" 
only involves one).
Finally, Factor (MS)17 loaded most heavily on 
the retaliation (Partner's Intention whenever You Play 
Red) and absolution (Partner's Intention whenever You 
Play Black after Having Played Red) items, play red- 
play black: these involved prediction of actual behavior 
as opposed to the others which were clarity ratings.
This factor shall be called a Move-Prediction factor.
Table 11 shows that these two items intercorrelate 
negatively with each other. This was expected since 
the confederate's prepared communications called for her 
to retaliate the subject's competitive response by choosing 
red on the next trial, but to absolve this subject if she 
then chose black by choosing black on the next trial.
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Comparison between experimental conditions on 
ratings of "Other person" items. Table 13 presents 
a summary of separate multivariate and corresponding 
univariate analyses of variance performed on the factor 
scores and on the items of the “Other person" rating 
scale, giving the effect of four levels of communication, 
two levels of affect and two levels of trust upon the 
dependent variables. As before, the univariate analyses 
served to locate the significant effects uncovered by 
the corresponding multivariate analysis. Table 14 
summarizes the relevant means; the values in the cells 
range from 1 to 7, with values below 4 referring the the 
first item of the pair and values above 4 referring to 
the second item. For example, take the pleasant-unpleasant 
item; subjects in the television-friendly condition rated 
the other person as being rather pleasant (1.33) as compared 
to subjects in the television-unfriendly condition who 
rated the other person as being rather unpleasant (5.67).
Table 13 shows that the multivariate analyses 
performed on the factor scores and on the items of the 
“Other person" rating scale each revealed a significant 
main effect for the affect variable (P< .001). Subsequent >jr 
analyses of variance carried out on the factor scores 
of this rating scale showed subjects in the friendly 
condition differing significantly from subjects in the
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table 13
iltivariate and -univariate analyses of effects of four levels of communication, 
vo levels of affect and two levels of trust on factor scores and items of
"Other person" rating scale
iltivariate Tests: 
Factor Scores 
Items
i Communi- 
Ication(C)
Source of Variance
Affect 1 Trust I C x A C x T |A x T ? C x A x
(A) (I) S ( ' |
r-r.
.0011
.-ooii
livariate Tests: ;
(OP)I-Pleasantness-Eriendliness f 
pleasant-unpleasant ;
friendly-unfriendly 
admirable-contemptible 
altruistic-egotistic 
unselfish-selfish 
good-bad ,
(OP) II-Control-Aggression-Ac tivity;
controlling-unconstraining
aggressive-meek
active-passive
dynamic-subdued
domineering-submissive
(OP)III-Fairness-Trustworthiness-j' 
Cooperativeness }
fair-unfair 
objective-biased 
trustworthy-tricky 
cooperative-competitive 
credible-suspicious
(OP)IV-Skillfulness-Cleverness 
skillful-unskillful 
clever-stupid 
expert-ignorant 
competent-incompetent
(OP)V-Experience-Persuasiveness- 
Potency 
experienced-inexperienced 
persuasive-unpersuasive 
assuring-unassuring 
strong-weak ;
(OP)VI-Quick-wittedness 5
shrew<J-_dull I
<.10
i '.001; { * . 0 5  5
I c.ooii ; ;
j -.ooi- m i o 1 
? <.ooi . <.io ;
j <.025i
1 <.001; -..05 ;
I "-025; : [
I <.10 J i !
5 <.025; r I
\ <.005 ( I
<.01
<.025 !
<.10
S10
M O
<10
<.05
<.05
'.05
I <.05 
I <.10I
\ <10
: <-025
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TABLE 14
a
1
Mean factor scores and mean item ratings of "Other person" rating scale! fo r cc
Variables
(OP)I-Pleasantne ss-Friendliness
pleasant-unpleasant
friendly-unfriendly
admirable-contemptible
altruistic-egotistic
unselfish-selfish
good-bad
(OP)II-Control-Aggression-Activity
controlling-unconstraining
aggressive-meek
active-passive
dynamic-subdued
domine e r ing-submi s s ive
(OP)III-Fairness-Trustworthiness- 
Cooperativeness 
fair-unfair 
objective-biased 
trustworthy-tricky 
cooperative-competitive 
credible-suspicious
(OP )IV-Skillfulness-Cleverness 
skillful-unskillful 
clever-stupid 
expert-ignorant 
competent-incompe tent
(OP)V-Experience-Fersuasiveness- 
Poteney 
experienced-inexperienced 
persuasive-unpersuasive 
as suring-unas sur ing 
strong-weak
(OP)VI-Quick-wittedness 
shrewd-dull
Friendly Communication 
Pace-to- ri'elevi-; tele-
Conditions 
" Oritten pTT
face
-1.020
1.17
1.17 
2.00
2.17 
1.50 
1.67
fsion | phone
-0 * o oo
3• 50
4.17
4.00
3• 33
5.00
b
.066
1.33
3.33
1.67
1 1.00
1 2L .00
! o.304
I 2.83
f 2 .33
3 .17
\ 2.00
1-0.798 
! 1.33 
1 1.50 
I 2.33 
I 2.33 
I 2.00 
[ 1.83
: -0.459 
i 1.33 
; 1.33 
! 2.33 
; 3.33 
: 1.57 
\ 1.67
-0.341 
1.50
1.33
3.33
3.33 
2.83 
3.00
o
6
6
6
6
6
-nfrie
/ace
face
0.926 
•4.67 
4.33 
4.67 
5 .50 
4.50 
3.00
1 0.127 -0.840 0.083 s /- j o I 0.063
1 2.67 ; 4.50 3.33 ! ri D ; 1.83
j 3.00 4.17 2.83 s 6 i  2.50
I 3.17 4.00 2.00 1 8 ? 3.33
I 4.33 3-50 2.67 i 6 ; 4.33
! 3,00 4.67 3.83 f 6■.{ 1 2.50t
! 0.264 -0.450 0.003 1 6
1
?-0.600
! 1.83 1.00 1.50 1 6 ; 2.00
! 3.17 1.83 2.50 i 6 : 2.67
! 2.50 1.00 2.00 1 6 : 1,50
\ 2.00 1.00 1.33 1 6 1.17
I 3-5° 1.00 3.00 \ 6i i 3.83
1-0.155 0.356 0.350
i
! 6 0.309
; 2.33 2.83 3.00 I 6 3.00
i 2.17 2.67 2.67 ! 6 2,83
I 3.17 2.50 2.83 • 6 3.17
12.00 2.50 2.00 f 6 2.00
10.448 1 0.413 -0.430 1-0.531 1 6 ;! 0.421
(4.00 < 3.83 2.67 j 2.33 1 6 ! 4.33
' 2.17 ■i 2.17 1 1.83 i 1.57 ■ ' 6 | 2.67
; 1.83 1 2.33 ? 1.17 5 2,00 S 6 ! 2.50
\ 3-67 1 2.83 I 2.83 I 2.33 1 6 2.67
l 0.082 f 0.355 -0.207 1-0.053 : 6 0.383
13.50 2.83 ? 2.83 i 3.33 6 4.00
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ing scale| 70r> communication and control conditions
Jnfriendly Communication Conditions All Control N
.003
.50
.50
.00
.33
.00
i o
i 6 
6! o
! o
1 6I
-0.600 
2.00 
2 .67 
1,50 
1.17 
1.83
0.564
2.83 
4.00 
3.33 
2.50
4.83
.350 ! 6 0.309 1-0.466
.00 i 6 3,00 I 2.67
,67 | 6 : 2 .83 i 2.00
.83 '• 6 i 3.17 1 2.67
.00 1 6 !I, ;
2,00 ; 2.17
>
.531
I i
5 6 ! 0.421
i
1-0.164
.33 : 6 j 4.33 ! 1.83
.67 1 6 | 2.6? 1 3.33
.00 ; 6 1 2.50 i 2.67
.33 \ 6 2.67 j 1.50
.053 ; 6 0.383 j 0.370
.33 ? 6 4 .00 1 3.50
0.387
2.00
3.83 
2.00
3.83 
3.33
-0.372
2.17
1.83 
3.00 
2.00
-0.101
1.33 
3-83 
1.17
1.67 
1.83
-0.326
2.50
2.00
2.33
1.67
tten ;-— -3 race-tc--! Televi- TeTe- Written
j j
“ j
face ]sion
:
chone - —
1
341 I 6 ! 0.926 f 0.956
I
1 0.703 0.034 6
5.0 6 ! • 4.67 I 5.67 ! 4.67 2.83 6
33 6 h 4.33 ! 5.83 i 5.00 2.67 6
33 1 6 7 4.67 1 5.00 4.17 2.83 6
33 6 : 5.50 ! 3.83 1 4.17 3.50 6
83 1 6 4.50 | 5.33 I 5.33 2.67 6
00 i 6 : 3.00 1 3.33I j 3-33 2.50
6
083 ! 6 0.063 0.326 1 0.320 0.330 6
33 6 : 1.83 1 2.33 ] 2.50 2.17 6
83 6 2,50 I 1.50 I 1.83 2.50 6
00 /•o 3.33 1 2.50 j 2.67 2.17 6
67 6 4.33 \ 3.50 I 2.67 2.50 6
.83 6 . 2.50 1 2.17 I 2.17?
2.50 6
6
6
6
6
6
! 6 
I 6
• Ii 6
I 6
A,,„
0.024 f-0.114 1 6 -0.109
2.33 ! 2.00 I 6 2.92
2.67 1 3.17 ? 6 2.46
2.83 ! 2.17 1 6 2.19
2.33 \ 1.83 I 6J. 2.50
0.299 i-0.631 ! 6 . 0.016
2.67 I 2.33 I 6 3.13
0,070
2.90
2.90 
3.33 
3.52
3.23 
2.54
-0.060
2.85
2.81
2.98
3-35
3.23
-0.112
1.73
3.15
1.90
1.81
2.92
-0.012
2.67
2.31
2.85
2.04
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
- 0.561
2.17
2.17
2.83
3.50
2.67
2.67
0.479
2.83
3.50
3.67
4.17 
5.00
0.896
2.33 
3-50 
3.17
3.83
3.83
0.092
2.83
2.50
3.33
2.50
0.872
3.84
4.67
3.83
3.17
-0.131 
3 *-00
6
6
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■unfriendly condition on Factor (OP)I (Pleasantness- 
Friendliness) (P&L .001) and Factor (OP)II (Control- 
Aggression-Activity) (P^.IQ); subjects in the friendly 
condition rated their partner significantly more pleasant 
and unconstraining than subjects in the unfriendly condi­
tion. This finding found support in the analyses of 
variance performed on the individual items of the rating 
scale. Subjects in the friendly condition rated their 
partner significantly more pleasant (P< .001), friendly 
(P-i.001), admirable (P<.001), altruistic (P<.025), 
unselfish (P^..001) and good (P^.025), therefore, the 
affect manipulation in the experiment was obviously 
effective. These subjects in the friendly condition 
also rated their partner significantly more unconstraining 
(P^.025), meek (P k.005) and submissive (P^.01) than 
subjects in the hostile condition; therefore, the .'/friendly 
confederate came across as being less dominating than 
the unfriendly confederate. Finally, subjects in the 
friendly condition rated their partner significantly 
more objective (P^.10), cooperative (P<-.10), credible 
(P .10), persuasive (P ^.10) and weak (P<~ .05).
In addition, the univariate analyses tmcovered 
differences in ratings between the four communication 
conditions for credible-suspicious (P^-.IO) and experienced- 
inexperienced (?•£■ .025). Duncan's Multiple Range test
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performed on the means of the four communication conditions 
revealed that subjects in the telephone condition rated 
the other person significantly more credible than subjects 
in the television condition (P4. .05); it would appear, 
therefore, that the confederate came across as more 
manipulative in the television than in the telephone 
condition. With regards to the experienced-inexperienced 
item, Duncan's Multiple Range test revealed that subjects 
in the face-to-face condition rated the other person 
significantly more inexperienced than subjects in the other 
communication conditions (P< .05); therefore, it would 
appear that, when the confederate participated in person, 
she came across as being more natural and naive (i.e., 
inexperienced).
Finally, the communication-by-affect interaction 
observed for Factor (0P)I (P < .05), due apparently to 
its two scales unselfish-selfish (P< .05) and admirable- 
contemptible (P< .10), is worthy of note. When Duncan's 
Multiple Range test was performed on each of these items, 
subjects in the hostile condition rated the other person 
significantly more selfish and contemptible than subjects 
in the friendly condition for each communication condition 
(PC.05), except the written condition where no signi­
ficant differences between the affect conditions emerged. 
Therefore, the interaction noted for these variables can 
be attributed to the reluctance of subjects in the written-
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unfriendly condition to rate the other person as contemp­
tible or selfish, compared to the subjects in the other 
unfriendly conditions. Unfortunately, this does not 
help to explain the unusually low cooperation level of 
the telephone-unfriendly condition.
Comparison between experimental conditions on 
ratings of "Experiment" items. Table 15 summarizes the 
equivalent multivariate and corresponding univariate 
analyses of variance performed on the factor scores and 
on the items of the "Experiment" rating scale. Table 
16 presents the relevant means.
Although no significant effects were observed 
in the multivariate analysis of the factor scores of the 
"Experiment" rating scale, the multivariate analysis 
performed on the items of the scale revealed a significant 
main effect for the trust variable (P 2 .10). When the 
items of this scale were subsequently submitted to analyses 
of variance, two significant differences emerged: these 
were in the opposite direction to - expectations. 
High-trust subjects rated the experiment significantly 
more fake and unreal than low-trust subjects (P< .025).
Note in addition that there was no difference 
between communication conditions for the Evaluation- 
Interest, Genuineness-Authenticity and Quality-of-Execu- 
tion factors. Therefore it is important to note that no
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TABLE 15
Multivariate and univariate analyses of variance of effects of four levels of 
communication, two levels of affect and two levels of trust on factor scores
and items of "Experiment" rating scale
| Source of Variance
^ommuni- ■; Affect / Trust p x A •. 0 x T „■ A x T; (J x A x 
bation(C)i (A) / (T) J j | •
Multivariate Tests: 
Factor Scores 
Items
! ? ! 1 \ * ‘I 
( i f j ; }
1 i' i | \ i l
\ ? s *.10 ; \ \t r. 5. j ; •
Univariate Tests:
(EX)I-Evaluation-Interest 
valuable -wo r th.1 ess 
good-bad
engrossing-tiring
interesting-boring
useful-useless
I I j: ! $ i \
1 1 1 1 i i i
I I 5 j I } s 
J 1- 5 r J i <.05 ;
M  M  M
I i 5 { 5 1 ■: 
/ ( j i i i /
\ ? 1 *' ■ ; - r 
(EX)II~Genuineness-Authenticity I j j s j . {
genuine-deceitful j I } I 1 1 J
authentic-fake j j | <-.02^  \ ! 1
real-unreal 1 > ) < .025 \ j {
honest-dishonest j | f 1 1 1 1
(EX)III-Quality-of-Execution 
well executed-poorly executed
i j i  j
i i j j <.10;
! i 1 !
j | ! ] 5
1 1 ! 1 ! i
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TABLE 16
Mean factor scores and mean item ratings of "Experiment" rating scale i ' o r  coma
Variables { friendly Communication Conditions fJnfrienc
i race-to-; Teievi-j Teie- ; /vritten ; L paue-ic-j
| face | sion j phone | j [face f
(EX)I-Evaluation-Interest 1 -0.156 -0.495 0.369 ? 0.004 ; 6 J 0.559 •
valuable-worthle ss \ 2.00 1.83 i 2.33 | 2.17 } 6j 2.67
good-bad 1.50 1.67 i 2.67 i 1.83 i 6! 2.17
engrossing-tiring 3.67 3.17 1 4.50 1 3.67 \ 6 : 4.17
interesting-boring 2.33 2.33 ! 2.83- ! 1.83 ! 61 3-50 l;
useful-useless 2.50 j 1.33 j 2.67 j 2.83 \ 6 j 2.67 I
(EX)II-Genuineness-Authenticity -0.347i 0.191 1 0.234 !
I
-0.246 1 6 |-0.039 ]
genuine-de c e it ful 2.17 | 3-00 1 3.17 j 2.50 j 6 ! 2.50 1
authentic-fake 2.50 { 2.67 I 3.50 j 2.33 i 6 f; 2.50 |
real-unreal 2.50 I 2.67 ; 3.00 | 2.33 j 6 f 3.50 V
honest-dishonest 1.67 S
5(
2.00 j
1
2.17 j 2 . 1 7  ■ r*“  '■! 0 1 nO 0: , X 1 I
(EX)III-wuality-of-Execution 0.805! -0.134 ! 0.102 i ,0.067 ; 6 (--0 . 321 *
well executed-poorly executed 2.50 (
! 1.17 |i\
I
1.50 1j 1.67 ;
s
6 ; 1-00
i
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scale ...'-'or communication and control conditions
ons
n ;
fUnfriendly Communication 
iHWce^-j i'elevi- [i'eis- ‘ V :
Conditions 
Trit'ten 2" TT
All N Control N
iiace
1 \ i
1 6 t 0.559 0.025
i 6 f 2.67 2.17
i 61 2.17 2.17
| 614.17 3.67
j 6 1 3-50 f 2.67
1 6| 2.67 |
\ ■' :
2.00
1 6 :-0.039 -0.278
i 6 i 2.50 [ 2.50
j 6 ? 2.50 f 2.33
| 6 13-50 t 2,67
I 5 12.17 [
i
1.50
i s '-0,321 i 0.444
j 6 ; I.00 1 2.00
sion ipiione
1-0.493 
I 2.00 j 
I 1.83 I 
j 2.00 | 
2.00 
| 2-0°  j
I 0.199 I 
I 3-00 
2.67 
1 2.00 
(2.67
1.00
0.187
2.33
2.33
3.83 
2,50 
2.67
0.286
3.00
3.50
2.83
2.50
-0.363
1.00
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
/
-0.0311 
2.19 I 
2.02 ! 
3.58 | 
2.50 
2.33
0.013
2.73
2.75
2.69
2.10
i 1 . 4 8
48
48
48
4 8
48
48
48
4 8
48
4 8
48
4 8
48
0.247
2.83 
3.00
3.17
2.83
1.83
- 0.101
2.83
2.17
2.50
2.50
1.83
i
6
6
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one communication condition rated the experiment more 
interesting or more fake or better executed than any other 
communication condition.
Comparison between experimental conditions on 
ratings of "Message1* items. Table 17 summarizes the 
equivalent multivariate and corresponding univariate 
analyses of variance performed on the factor scores and 
on the items of the "Message" rating scale. Table 18 
presents the relevant means.
Table 17 shows that the multivariate analysis 
revealed a significant communication effect for items 
(P <£.05) and a significant communication-by-affect 
interaction for factor scores (P< .06) and for items 
(P <.05).
The univariate analyses performed on the items 
showed that the absolution (Partner's Intention whenever 
You Play Black after Having Played Red) "play red-play 
black" item differed across communication conditions 
(P £-.025). Duncan's Multiple Range test revealed that 
subjects in the face-to-face condition answered the 
play-red alternative— the incorrect answer-__ 
significantly more often than subjects in the television 
condition who answered the play-black alternative (P <
.05). Since the confederate presented the same communi­
cation in each case, it would appear that her actual
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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TABLE 17
/iultivariate and. univariate analyses of variance of effects of four levels of 
jommunication, two levelsof affect and two levels of trust on factor scores
and items of "Message" rating scale
Source of Variance 
dommuni- ? Affect»Trust' <0 x A jO x 1) Ax T
cation(C)f (A) j (T)
/Iultivariate Tests:
Factor Scores
Items S05
Jnivariate Tests:
(MS)I-Clarity-of-Intention 
(first degree) 
INTENTION, communicated-not 
coimnunicated 
INTENTION. clear-unclear 
RETALIATION, communicated-not 
communicated 
RETALIATION. clear-unclear
(MS)II-Clarity-o f-Expe c tat ion 
EXPECTATION, communicated-not 
communicated 
EXPECTATION, clear-unclear
(MS)III-Clarity-of-Intention 
(second degree) 
ABSOLUTION, communicated-not 
communicated 
ABSOLUTION, clear-unclear
(MS)IV-Move-Prediction I
RETALIATION, play red-play "black 
ABSOLUTION, play red-play black <..025
^.10
^.025
06 
<.05
: \ . 0 1
<.01
<..01
i
< .05 
<.05
<.05
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TABLE 18
nan factor scores and mean item ratings of "Message" rating scale for tlie
ariables Friendly Communication Conditions
\ FaceUr- 
l face
! Televi­
sion
Tele- 7
phone |
written k '
MS)l-Clarity-of-Intention (first degree) 1 0.436 0.578 -0.330 0.295 I 6
NTENTION. communicated-not communicated i 1.50 1.83 1.00 j 1.33 ? 6
NTEETION. clear-unclear 1 1-83 1.67 1.00 { 1.50 1 6
ETALIATION. communicated-not communicated 1.17 1.17 1.17 ! 1.50 i 6
ETALIATION. clear-unclear 2.33 1.83 1.17 | 1.50 | 6
MS)lI-Clarity-of-Sxpectation -0.155 -0.118 0.196 \ 0.390 1 6
XPECTATION. communicated-not communicated 1.33 1.33 2.00 | 2.33 j 6
XP ECTATION. clear-unclear . 1.33 1.83 2.00 1 2.50 \j
0.417 1
6
IS)III-Clarity-of-Intention (second degree) 0.620 -0.815 - 0.330 1 6
BSOLUTION. communicated-not communicated 1.00 3.83 1.33 j 1.33 1 6
BSOLUTION, clear-unclear 1.00 3.67 1.50 | 1.33 j 6
IS)IY-Move-Prediction 0.837 -0.691 -0.329 I -0.397 1 6
ETALIATION. play red-play black 3.00 1.00 1.50 S 
6.33 \
1.67 ! 6
3S0LUTI0NV play red-play black 3.00 6.33 6.67 !
i1
6
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r the sonnnication conditions
onditions 
Irxtteh ~X
0.295 •: 6 i
1.33 1 6 ;f
1.50 i 6 f
1.50 j 6 I
1.50 i 6 \ 
; *
0.390
t j
! 6 I
2.33 j 6 1
2.50 6
l f
0.417 1 6 1
1.33 j 6 !
1.33 ! 6 !
-0.397 1 6 •:
1.67 1 6 )
6.67 i 6 }
Unfriendly Coamunication Conditions 
Vace-to- jielevx-; 'l'eie- j Vfrdt'ten'g IT
face fsion fphone | I
-0.445
1.17
1.00
1.00
1.00
-0.315
1,00
1.00
0.053
1.50
2.00
0.118 
1.17 
! 1.17 
’l 1.50 
j 1.50
1-0.399 
f 1.00
I 1 * 3 5
\ 0.439 
1.33 
i i.i7
\
-0.1511 
1.33
1.17 
1.50
1.17
0.050 -0.224 
1.00 I 2.00 
3.33 6.17
0.643 j 
2.67 ! 
2.50 j
.s
-1.102 [ 
4.00 i 
3.83 f
-0.499
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
-0.240
1.00
1.17
0.058
2.33
1.83
0.108 0.645 ‘
1.00 3-17
3-17 3.67
6
6
6:
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
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presence in the experimental room distracted the subject 
from the absolution ingredient of her communication.
In addition, for this item fable 17 shows a significant 
effect for the affect variable (P< .025)* subjects in 
the friendly condition answered the play-black alternative 
the correct one— significantly more often than subjects 
in the unfriendly condition. Perhaps subjects in the 
hostile condition were so concerned with their negative 
reactions toward the confederate that they let the 
absolution aspect of the communication slip by them. 
However, despite the fact that Table 17 fails to show a 
communication-by-affect interaction for this item, the 
communication and affect main effects may be inter­
preted in light of the fact that subjects in the face- 
to-face-friendly and -unfriendly, in the telephone- 
unfriendly and in the written-unfriendly conditions 
answered the incorrect red alternative, while subjects 
in the television-friendly and -unfriendly, telephone- 
friendly and written-friendly conditions answered the 
correct black alternative. This observation in the 
telephone-unfriendly condition may provide some clue in 
accounting for the competitive behavior of subjects in 
this condition.
Table 17 also points out that the multivariate 
analysis uncovered a significant communication-by-affect 
interaction both for factor scores (?<.05) and items
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(P < .05). Subsequent univariate analyses revealed signi­
ficant communication-by-affect interactions for factor 
(MS)II (Clarity-of-intention, second degree) (P^ .01) 
and for the items communicated-not communicated and 
clear-unclear (P^ .01). The interactions pointed out 
that the absolution ingredient of the communication was 
least clear in the television-friendly and telephone- 
hostile conditions. Duncan's Multiple Range test performed 
on the means of these two items for the eight experimental 
conditions showed that subjects in these two conditions 
rated the absolution aspect of the communication signi­
ficantly less communicated and clear than subjects in 
the face-to-face-friendly, written-friendly, telephone- 
friendly, television-unfriendly and face-to-face-unfrian<Ily 
conditions (P^.05). Therefore, of the four conditions 
that answered the move prediction of the absolution 
ingredient incorrectly (face-to-face-friendly, face-to- 
face-, telephone- and written-unfriendly), only the 
telephone-unfriendly condition also rated tha absolution 
ingredient unclear. It is also interesting to note that 
the television-friendly condition which rated the absolution 
ingredient unclear answered the move prediction of the 
absolution ingredient correctly. Therefore, it may be 
that the failure of the subjects in the telephone- 
unfriendly condition to see the confederate's willingness 
to exonerate them if they chose red prompted them to 
react negatively toward her and to exhibit competitive
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behavior. This negative reaction failed to occur in the 
television-friendly condition because of the friendliness 
of the confederate: furthermore, these subjects, despite 
claiming that the absolution ingredient of the communi­
cation was unclear, were aware that the confeaerate 
would absolve them if they chose black after having chosen 
red by choosing black.
Comparison between experimental and control 
conditions on ratings of "Other person" items. Since 
the control subjects also responded to the "Other person" 
and "Experiment" rating scales, it was deemed useful 
to compare tneir responses to those of all the other 
subjects and also to those of each of the communication 
conditions separately. Table 19 carries a summary of 
these analyses for the "Other person" rating scale.
Table 14- again presents the relevant means.
Table 19 reveals for factor (OP)I (Pleasantness- 
Priendliness) significant differences between the controls 
and face-to-face-, television- and telephone-unfriendly 
conditions. The differences noted for the items on 
which this factor loaded can be characterized as follows: 
the experimentals in the friendly condition responded 
more positively to the items than the controls while 
those in the unfriendly condition responded more negatively 
than the controls. These differences between controls
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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TABLE 19
Comparison between controls and communication conditions on factor scores
Variables I All >Friendly Communication Conditi;
(OP)I-Pleasantness-Friendliness
pleasant-unpleasant
friendly-unfriendly
admirable-contemptible
altruistic-egotistic
unself ish-selfish
good-bad
(OP)II-Control-Aggression-Activityf 
controlling-unconstraining j!
aggressive-meek j
active-passive I
dynamic-subdued 5
domineering-submissive ■;
I
I
(OP)III-Pairness-TrustwortMness- !
Cooperativeness |
fair-unfair |
objective-biased |
trustworthy-tricky i
cooperative-competitive I
credible-suspicious ?
<
■t Pace- to*-Tele vi-f Tele-
Iface
i
! ^-05
?
i*
I 4 .10 
\ * .10
.05
,025
.05
,01
4.05 
* .05
< .01
?sion
4.10
4.10
?hone
.10
4.025 ! 
4 .005 f
4 .10 \
4.025 I 
c ,025 1 
^.025 I
vvrit'ceh T
4'. 01
<.10 
A 1 f .i. \
<.10
,025
(OP)IV-SkiHfulness-Cleverness
skillful-unskillful
clever-stupid
expert-ignorant
competent-incompetent
(OP)V-Sxperience-Persuasivene ss- 
Potency 
experienced-inexperienced 
persuasive-unpersuasive 
assuring-unassuring 
strong-weak
(OP)VI-Quick-wittedness 
shrewd-dull
.025
.005
..01
4 .025 
 ^.05
,05
<.02 5 | <.025
< .01
< .005
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bor scores : r i d  items of "Other person" rating scale
m  Condition: 
jt: I "Wrrften
le i:
LO <. 01
friendly Communication Conditions 
-face- Lu—* Tele v'r'^ ~re'l^ =r_“ ;/rrlrfrCT: 
face } sion iphone 4
T Z
r .005 % < .001 * * .05
*.10 1 *.001 1 *.10
I * .005 1 *. 025
<.10 
< .05 
* .10
* .025
s .01 .01
<.10 
2 .10
.10
<r .'025 I. *.10 I
< .05 ..05 !
- .10 
^  .10 
*.05
025 \ 
005 f 
10 I 
025 1 
025 | 
025 5
<.10
<.025
.025
.025
- .05
- .10
- .05 
* .10 
*.10
025} <.025
■01 | . .
.005 -20
'■ .10
I <105
<.05
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and experimentals were especially prevalent in the 
unfriendly conditions.
No significant differences appeared for Factor 
(OP)II (Control-Aggression-Activity). However, for the 
items of this factor, where significant differences 
appeared, the experimentals rated the other person more 
controlling, aggressive and active than the controls 
(see Table 14). This makes sense in view of the fact 
that in the communication conditions the confederate 
in her communicator role controlled the situation.
For Factor (OP)III (Fairness-Trustworthiness- 
Cooperativeness), several significant differences emerged, 
both for the factor itself and for the items; where 
significant differences appeared, the experimentals 
rated the other person more fair, trustworthy and coopera­
tive than the controls, regardless of the affect condition 
(see Table 14). This occured most frequently in the 
telephone-friendly and written-unfriendly conditions. 
Therefore, it would appear that, with communication, 
the subject's perception of her partner is different 
from the perception of the subject in a typical prisoner’s 
dilemma experiment where no explicit communication is 
possible. That is, when subjects are not allowed to 
communicate, they perceive thei^nartner as being untrust­
worthy and competitive. This explains the prevalence of
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competitive behavior so typical of subjects in a typical 
prisoner’s dilemma situation where explicit communication 
is unavailable (Rapoport, 1963).
Finally, for Factor (OP)V (Experience-Persuasiveness- 
Potency), a number of differences appeared between the 
ratings of the controls and the ratings of the experimentals, 
especially for those in the friendly conditions. Where 
differences appeared, the experimentals rated the other 
person significantly more experienced, persuasive and 
potent. This again is expected in view of the fact that 
the confederate could communicate her message and therefore 
bring herself to bear on the subject.
Comparison between experimental and control 
conditions on ratings of "Experiment" items. Table 20 
contrasts experimental subjects with control subjects 
for the "Experiment" rating data. Table 16 presents the 
relevant means. When differences appeared between the 
ratings of the controls and experimentals, the controls 
rated the experiment significantly more worthless and 
bad than the experimentals. Therefore, it would seem 
that subjects who cannot communicate explicitly in a 
prisoner's dilemma experiment tend to respond negatively 
in evaluating the experiment. A previous finding in 
this study indicated that, the more subjects recognized 
some value in the experiment, the more they were occupied 
with it. This would indicate that the typical no-
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TABLE 20
Comparison Between controls and communication conditions on factor score
Variables All friendly Communication Conditions
Bace-to-
face
i Televi­
sion
| Teie- 
| phone
1 Written
(EX)I-Evaluation-interest 
valuabl e-worthie s s 
good-bad
engrossing-tiring 
interesting-boring 
useful-useless
.10
.05 .10
t
ii
f
j
\I
i5
!
t
I
Y
(EX)II-Genuineness-authenticity
genuine-deceitful
authentic-fake
real-unreal
honest-dishonest
!
i
i,c
•
i
if
:
(EX)111-Quali t y-o f-Exe cut ion 
well executed-poorly executed
I
j
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ctor score .terns of "Experiment" rating scale
Conditior 
l Written"
[Unfriendly Communication Conditions
jface-
face
-to--? felevi-] Tele- 
]sion ]phone
w.\  I 1 - —
Written
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communication prisoner’s dilemma experiment leaves the 
subject with negative impressions regarding its value and 
consequently the subject fails to become involved.
Results Associated with the Trust Variable
Since no effects could be attributed to the trust 
variable in the analyses of the performance data, some 
trust effects in the rating scales have been so far 
disregarded. At this point, these few findings are 
worthy of mention.
First, Table 13 shows a significant affect-by- 
trust interaction for Factor (OP)I (Pleasantness-Friendli- 
ness) of the "Other person" rating scale (P * .05). This 
interaction is due apparently to the affect-by-trust 
interaction observed for the two items: friendly-
unfriendly ( P .05) and admirable-contemptible (P^ .10). 
For the friendly condition, hi ih-trust subjects rated 
the other person friendly (1.42) and admirable (2.58), 
while low-trust subjects rated the other person only 
slightly more friendly (1.25) and admirable (2.41).
However for the unfriendly condition, high-trust subjects 
rated the other person somewhat less friendly (3.58) and 
admirable (3*41), while low-trust subjects rated the other 
person somewhat unfriendly (5.33) and contemptible (4.92). 
Keeping in mind that a rating of less than 4 signifies 
friendly and admirable while a rating of more than 4
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
75
signifies -unfriendly and contemptible, the interaction 
can be attributed to the reluctance of subjects in the 
high-trust condition to rate the hostile confederate 
as being unfriendly and contemptible.
Another affect-by-trust interaction was observed 
for the valuable-worthless item of the "Experiment" 
rating scale (P <.05). For the friendly condition, 
high-trust subjects rated the experiment very valuable 
(1.75), while low-trust subjects rated it less valuable 
(2.42). For the -unfriendly condition, high-trust subjects 
rated the experiment less valuable (2.57) while low-trust 
subjects rated it more valuable (1.92). Therefore, all 
the groups rated the experiment on the valuable end of 
the scale. However, the interaction can be attributed 
to the tendency of the friendly-low-trust group and the 
unfriendly-high-trust group to rate the experiment 
somewhat less valuable.
Finally, another affect-by-trust interaction 
was noted in the "Message" rating scale for Factor 
(MS)II (Clarity-of-Expectation) (p c.05) and its two 
items eommunicated-not communicated (P< .05) and clear- 
unclear (P<.05). For the friendly condition, high-trust 
subjects rated the expectation ingredient of the communi­
cation as being only somewhat communicated (2.25) and 
clear (2.42) while the low-trust subjects rated it more
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communicated (1.25) and clear (1.41). On the other hand* 
for the unfriendly condition, high-trust subjects rated 
the expectation ingredient most communicated (1*00) 
and clear (1.00) while the low-trust subjects rated it 
somewhat less communicated (1.83) and clear (2.00).
In view of the fact that each group rated these items 
below 4, each felt that the expectation ingredient of 
the communication was clear. However, the interaction 
can be attributed to the reluctance of high-trust subjects 
in the friendly condition and of low-trust subjects in 
the unfriendly condition to rate the expectation ingre­
dient as being extremely communicated and clear.
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DISCUSSION
This experiment has uncovered a number of impor­
tant results: (1) the effect of communication versus
no communication on cooperation in the prisoner’s 
dilemma game: (2) the effect of repeating a communication, 
with appropriate modifications when necessary; (3) the 
effect of different kinds of communication channels which 
are commonly used in actual life: (4) tne effect of commu­
nicator friendliness and its interaction with communication 
channel: and (5) the dimensionality of subjects' per­
ceptions of the other person, the experiment and the 
communication.
Effects of Communication in General
first, with regards to communication effects 
in general, the results ofithis experiment support the 
hypothesis that one-way communication which is honest, 
firm and correct facilitates cooperative interaction in 
a prisoner's diletmna situation. It would appear that 
these types of messages instill in subjects trust which, 
as Deutsch (1958) has indicated, plays a critical role 
in facilitating cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games: 
that is, the messages enabled the subjects to be reason­
ably certain that the other person would reciprocate their 
cooperative response and would not deliberately exploit 
them by selecting the competitive strategy. Our results 
are consistent with those of a number of other investi-
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gators who have studied different aspects of communi­
cation in prisoner's dilemma situations (Bixenstine & 
Douglas, 1967; Bixenstine et al., 1966; Deutsch, 1958,
I960; Loomis, 1959* ferhune, 1968; Wallace & Rothaus,
1969, Wichman, 1970).
In addition, the competitive behavior of the 
control subjects in this experiment is also character­
istic of the behavior of subjects in a PD situation 
(Rapoport, 1963). We reiterate, as have each of the 
above investigators, that subjects' failure to cooperate 
in a typical prisoner's dilemma situation is due to the 
fact that there is no contact between partners, beyond 
the knowledge of the other person's previous choice.
Indeed, after the experiment, several control subjects 
admitted the benefit of the mutual cooperative strategy; 
however, they said that they failed to carry it out 
because they could not trust the other person to reci­
procate their cooperative choice. Also, the post-experi­
mental rating scales have helped interpret the competitive 
behavior of the controls by revealing that, without 
communication, subjects' perception of the other person 
is different from the perception of the subjects with 
communication. Without communication, subjects reacted 
more negatively toward the other person— that is, they 
rated the other person more unfair, untrustworthy,
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competitive and unpersuasive; with communication, subjects 
reacted more positively toward the other person— that is, 
they rated the other person more fair, trustworthy, 
cooperative and persuasive. In addition, subjects who 
could not communicate explicitly tended to respond 
negatively in evaluating the experiment and were less 
occupied with it.
Effect of Repeating a Communication
This experiment also showed that, for all commu­
nication conditions, the mean number of cooperative 
choices per five-trial block increased in the block 
immediately after each communication, only to fall 
during the next block— almost as if the effects of the 
communication were dissipating. However, despite this 
decrease, immediately after the next communication, 
cooperation in that block reached a higher peak than its 
previous plateau. Moreover, on the final block of the 
game, after the third and final communication, coopera­
tion actually increased slightly for subjects in the 
friendly condition, but decreased for subjects in the 
unfriendly condition. Therefore, communication— or at 
least the third communication— had an enduring effect in 
the friendly communication conditions but not in the 
unfriendly conditions.
Contrast this pattern for the communication
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conditions with the behavior of the controls which showed 
corresponding decreases in cooperation as the game 
progressed. Cooperation did increase slightly on the 
last block, but this did not offset the previous decline. 
Effect of Communication Channel
Next, the significant main effects attributed 
to the communication variable is worthy of mention. This 
experiment has demonstrated the usefulness of studying 
the effect of the communication medium on interpersonal 
interactions. It was hypothesized that increasing the 
number of communication modes for a given message would 
result in more cooperation. This proposition was based 
on the premise that differing amounts and kinds of 
information are transmitted by written, vocal and visual 
modes and between direct face-to-face and indirect 
communication means. For example, Mehrabian (1968) has 
suggested that communication.-is 7 percent verbal, 38 
percent vocal and 55 percent visual. The results of 
this experiment supported this hypothesis in part. 
Subjects in the face-to-face and television communication 
conditions, which capitalize on all three communication 
modes, exhibited more cooperation and earned signifi­
cantly greater payoffs than subjects in the telephone 
condition, which capitalizes on only the linguistic and 
paralinguistic modes. This observation is consistent
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with, that of Wichman (1970) who noted that subjects who 
could see and hear each other cooperated more than subjects 
who could only hear each other, unexpectedly, the present 
subjects in the written condition, which capitalizes on 
only the linguistic mode, fell in between the face-to- 
face and television conditions on the one hand and the 
telephone condition on the other; it did not differ 
significantly from any of these other communication 
conditions. Unfortunately, v/ichman (1970) did not have 
an equivalent condition to our written condition.
This communication effect noted in this study 
is significant at the five percent level for the payoff 
performance measure; but it fails to attain significance 
for the choice measure, although it does approach 
significance at the ten percent level. This discrepancy 
between the significance tests for the two performance 
measures may be due to the absolute value of the numbers 
involved. That is, the choice measure was quantified by 
scoring black cooperative choices 1 and red competitive 
choices 0. On the other hand, the payoff data consisted 
of the subject’s earnings as determined by the values 
in the various cells of the matrix which ranged from 1 
to 5- Therefore, the payoff data represent a wider 
range than the choice data, which accounts, for the 
failure of the analysis of variance to result in a
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statistically significant difference for choices. Since 
subjects were concerned with payoffs rather that choices, 
it is important to give due attention to payoffs as a 
dependent variable rather .'than restrict analyses to choice 
data.
Consistent with the original hypothesis, it was 
expected that the written communication condition, which 
capitalizes only on the linguistic mode, would experience 
the lowest cooperation level; therefore, it was hypo­
thesized that the scarcity of nonverbal cues would be 
dysfunctional to any meaningful interaction. However, 
this was not the case. Subjects in the written condition 
performed more cooperatively and earned greater payoffs 
(although not significantly) than subjects in the telephone 
condition. However, this fact still does not discount the 
original hypothesis. Subjects in the note condition 
were observed rereading the notes a number of times.
Of course, it was impossible for subjects in the other 
conditions to receive more than one exposure to each 
communication. Therefore, the mope cooperative behavior 
of subjects in the written condition can be attributed to 
their increased understanding of the content of the com­
munication. Although this situation approaches most closely 
real life, it might be useful in a further investigation 
to place the written note on a revolving drum so that the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
83
subjects would recieve only one exposure to the communi­
cation.
Effect of Communicator Friendliness
With regards to the affect variable, this experi­
ment showed that, even though communication elicits more 
cooperation than no communication, the kind of affect 
expressed by the communicator is important. A friendly 
approach is relatively more effective in;inducing coope­
ration and leads to higher payoffs than an unfriendly 
approach: this is consistent with the original hypothesis. 
Subjects in the unfriendly condition, more so than subjects 
in the friendly condition, hesitated to choose the coope­
rative alternative because, as several of them described 
after the experiment, they felt that the other person 
was the type of person who would deliberately deceive 
them and choose the exploitive competitive alternative 
to satisfy her own needs. Indeed, subjects in the unfriendly 
condition rated the other person more unpleasant, controlling 
and competitive than subjects in the friendly condition, 
which may explain why they reacted competitively toward 
the other person.
Gommunication-by-affect Interaction
However, it is extremely important that these 
significant main effects for communication and affect 
be interpreted in light of the communication-by-affeet
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interaction observed in this experiment. Of the eight 
communication-by-affect conditions, the telephone-unfriendly 
condition stands out most noticeably with its low level 
of cooperation and lower payoffs. Indeed, it was the only 
condition which failed to differ from the competitively- 
oriented controls. In addition, only in the telephone 
communication condition did subjects in the unfriendly 
condition make significantly fewer cooperative responses 
and earn substantially lower payoffs than their counter­
parts in the friendly condition. Therefore, the competi­
tive performance of the telephone condition noted pre­
viously must be attributed to the competitive behavior 
of the subjects in the telephone-unfriendly condition.
And also, the competitive performance of the subjects 
in the unfriendly conditions must be ascribed in large 
part to this same telephone-unfriendly condition.
Therefore, it would appear than subjects in the 
telephone-unfriendly condition were less able to profit 
from communication than subjects in the other communi­
cation conditions- these subjects were inclined to give 
free vent to their negative reactions by behaving compe­
titively toward the confederate. This parallels the 
everyday situation where people feel freer to "give shit" 
to other people when they cannot see them. This false 
sense of security which accompanies such a reaction may
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be attributed to the fact that the speaker enjoys 
anonimity: furthermore, she may feel less threatened 
in the event that the other should rebuke her because 
the lack of visual cues in the communication medium 
creates an impression of distance between herself and 
the other person. These post hoc explanations must be 
regarded as hypotheses that may be investigated in future 
research.
One may ask why the same competitive behavior 
fails to appear in the written.condition where, because 
of the lack of visual cues, this same anonimity and impres­
sion of distance occurs. An examination of the subjects’ 
response to the post-experimental "Message" rating scale 
provides some clues as to the solution of this
problem. Subjects in the telephone-unfriendly condition 
did not succeed in grasping the absolution aspect of the 
confederate's message 'whereas subjects in the written- 
unfriendly condition did see this, perhaps because they 
could reread the notes at will until they felt that they 
grasped the content of the message. This would suggest 
that the knowledge that the confederate would return to 
the cooperative strategy if they cooperated after having 
competed is crucial in inducing subjects to cooperate, 
at least when they are visually isolated from the other 
person. This again is another hypothesis worthy of
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experimental investigation.
One final note regarding applying the communication- 
by-affect interaction to the interpretation of the main 
affect effect is necessary. As mentioned already, subjects 
in the telephone-unfriendly condition reacted signifi­
cantly more negatively than subjects in the telephone- 
friendly condition. Similarly siibjects in the television- 
and written-unfriendly conditions behaved more competiti­
vely— although not significantly more— than their 
counterparts in the friendly condition. However, it is 
surprising to see subjects in the face-to-face-unfriendly 
condition behaving slightly more cooperatively— (yes, 
cooperatively S)— than subjects in the face-to-face 
friendly condition. And in addition the subjects in the 
face-to-face-unfriendly condition were just as adamant 
in their negative rating of the other person as were 
the other subjects in the unfriendly conditions. Since 
the ratings provide no clue in interpreting the cooperative 
bbehavior of the face-to-face-unfriendly condition, then 
perhaps their behavior can be explained by the fact that 
they feared to antagonize the other person because of 
the physical proximity between them and the other person. 
This is another question for future investigators to answer. 
Dimensionality of Subjects* Perceptions of Other Person, 
Experiment and Message
This experiment also uncovered some distinct
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dimensions in the subjects' perceptions of the other 
person, the experiment and the message.
Perceptions of other person. First, with regards 
to the subjects' perceptions of the other person, six 
factors emerged:
(OP)I-Pleasantness-Friendliness 
(OP)II-Control-Aggression-Activity 
(OP)III-Pairness-Trustworthiness-Cooperativeness 
(OP )IV-Skillfulness-Cleverness 
(OP)V-Experience-Persuasiveness-Potency 
(OP)VI-Ouick-wittedness 
Some of these seem to parallel tnose regularly found 
for the affective meanings of concepts in general 
(Osgood et al., 1957): evaluation (here Pleasantness- 
Priendliness), potency (here Experience-Persuasiveness- 
Potency) and activity (here Control-Aggression-Activity).
As already noted in this discussion section, 
the subjects' ratings on the items of these factors often 
provided clues in explaining their behavior in the 
experiment. Recall, for example, that subjects in the 
friendly condition rated their partner significantly 
more pleasant on the Pleasantness-Eriendliness factor, 
significantly more unconstraining on the Control-Aggression- 
Activity factor and significantly more cooperative on 
the Eairness-Trustworthiness-Cooperativeness factor than
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subjects in the unfriendly condition: this sheds some 
light on the cooperative behavior exhibited by the 
subjects in the friendly conditions. Recall also that 
subjects in the communication conditions, when compared 
to the controls, rated the other person more fair on the 
Pairness-Trustworthiness-Cooperativeness factor and more 
experienced on the Experience-Persuasiveness-Potency 
factor. These perceptions of the communication subjects 
help explain the cooperative behavior of these subjects 
as compared to the competitive behavior of subjects in 
the no-communication conditions.
In summary therefore, the subjects' perceptions 
of the other person vary from one condition to the next, 
providing some explanation for their behavior in the 
prisoner's dilemma game.
Perceptions of experiment. With regards to the 
subjects' perceptions of the experiment, three very 
distinct dimensions emerged:
(EX)I-Evaluation-Interest 
(EX)II-Genuineness-Authenticity 
(EX)III-Quality-of-Execution 
Note that the Evaluation-Interest factor parallels the 
evaluation factor in the affective meanings of concepts 
(Osgood et al., 1957).
Very important here is the fact that the various
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conditions, including the control no-communication 
condition, did not differ in their ratings on the two 
dimensions of Genuineness-Authenticity and Quality-of- 
Execution. These observations point to the very important 
conclusion that the conditions did not vary in their 
impressions of the legitimacy and the carrying-out of 
the experiment.
Similarly, the four communication conditions, 
excluding the controls, did not show any differences 
in their ratings on the Evaluation-Interest factor. 
Therefore, among the communication conditions, at least, 
there was no difference in the subjects' evaluation of 
the experiment and their interest in participating.
However, one important difference in the ratings 
on the Evaluation-Interest factor did appear; subjects 
in the control condition rated the experiment significantly 
less valuable and less interesting than subjects in the 
communication conditions. It would appear therefore that 
the control subjects, not holding high estimations of 
the study, would be inclined to disregard the instruction 
requesting them to concern themselves with their own 
earnings and feel free to do as they please, which, in 
a competitive situation like the PD game, Mvould appear to 
be to compete— even if it means their losing money.
Perceptions of message. With regards to the
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subjects * perceptions of the message, four factors 
emerged:
(MS)I-Clarity-of-Intention (first degree) 
(MS)II-Clarity-of-Expectation 
(MS)III-Clarity-of-Intention (second degree)
(MS)I7-Move-Prediction 
The Clarity-of-Intention (first degree)factor included 
the subjects’ impressions of how communicated and clear 
were the confederate's planned choice on the first trial 
and her planned choice when the subjects chose red. The 
Clarity-of-Expectation factor consisted in the subjects' 
impressions of how communicated and clear was the confe­
derate' s anticipation of their first choice in the game.
The diarity-of-Intention (second degree) factor included 
the subjects' impressions of how communicated and clear 
was the confederate's planned choice when they chose 
black after having chosen red. finally, the Move- 
Prediction factor consisted in the subjects' actual 
forecast of what the confederate would play after they 
played red and what the confederate would play when they 
played black after having played red.
Note that the factors obtained on the message ratings 
in this experiment do not agree with Deutsch's (1958) 
four minimum ingredients of a cooperative interchange 
(intention, expectation, retaliation and absolution) 
around which the messages were actually built; the
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Clarity-of-Intention (first degree) factor incorporates 
Deutsch's Intention and Retaliation factors; and this 
experiment adds a Move-Prediction factor which did not 
exist in Deutsch's categorization.
The subjects' responses to the absolution item 
of the Move-Prediction factor and to the two items of 
the Clarity-of-Intention (second degree) factor— which, 
as mentioned, deals with the subjects' impressions of how 
communicated and clear was the absolution aspect of the 
communication— sheds some light on the competitive 
behavior of the telephone-unfriendly condition. These 
subjects completely missed the absolution aspect of the 
communication, as indicated by the fact that they answered 
the move prediction item incorrectly; but more important, 
with respect to the Clarity-of-Intention (second degree) 
factor, they also rated the absolution ingredient 
unclear. Therefore, the competitive behavior of the 
telephone-unfriendly condition may be due to the failure 
of these subjects to see that the confederate would return 
to the cooperative choice if they themselves would return 
to it.
Trust Variable
In closing up the discussion of the results obtained 
in this study, it must be emphasized that no significant 
main effects could be attributed to the trust variable in 
any of the performance analyses. Perhaps another
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study where subjects were drawn from greater extremes 
of the distribution of scores and where the competitive 
overtones which accompany prisoner* s dilemma did not 
exist might provide different results.
Implications of the Study
The results of this study have a number of impli­
cations, both for PD research and for the real world.
first, for prisoner's dilemma research, this 
study supports the contention that explicit communication, 
rather than the mere sequence of choices, is necessary 
to induce a subject to cooperate in a PD situation. This 
experiment has shown, as have others (Bixenstine &
Douglas, 1967; Bixenstine et al., 1966; Deutsch, 1958,
I960; Loomis, 1959; Terhune, 1968; Wallace & Rothaus,
1969; Wichman, 1970), that subjects who can communicate 
in a prisoner's dilemma game tend to cooperate more than 
subjects who cannot. It has been shown, in addition, 
that the perception of subjects with regards to the other 
person and the experiment itself differ for subjects 
who can communicate and for subjects who cannot. And
* j
this has been related to their behavior in the game.
All these observations o^uestion the generality of the 
hundreds of prisoner's dilemma experiments performed in 
the last decade. It is evident that, when subjects cannot 
communicate beyond the mere knowledge of the other person's
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previous response, a competitive atmosphere which induces 
subjects to risk the competitive strategy prevails.
This situation, where individuals are deprived of the 
opportunity to adjust their behavior to others with 
the help of covert communication rarely occurs in real 
life.
This research also has a number of implications 
for the real world. First, in a society which may 
someday see many of us interacting in a work situation 
on closed-circuit television, even in the present state 
of technology (libby, 1969), there is some consolation 
that the television medium is as effective as the face- 
to-face medium in transmitting information and in induc­
ing cooperation. Indeed, it has been shown with the 
absolution ingredient of the message that television 
is perhaps more effective in getting across more complex 
notions which may excape the receiver of the communication 
in the flurry of cues that accompany face-to-face interaction.
But this research also has implications for the 
present world in terms of within- and between-organization 
communication,
First, the prisoner's dilemma game itself is 
a prototype of the problem of coordination which occurs 
so often in the real world. Often individuals in organi­
sations (e.g., two department heads) are faced with the
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choice of either cooperating or competing with each other, 
with the result that mutual cooperation leads to moderate 
benefits for both (e.g., a bonus), that cooperation by 
one and competition by the other leads to losses for the 
person who cooperated (e.g., a cut in salary) and strong 
gains for the person who competed (e.g., a promotion), but 
that mutual competition leads to severe repercussions 
for both (e.g., a demotion). The same pattern applies 
for inter-organizational relations. This study suggests 
that the mutual cooperative strategy, which is the best 
strategy in the long run, will not develop unless the 
parties— whether individuals or organizations— are able 
to coordinate their activity by communicating with each 
other. And more yet, this study showed that the bene­
ficial effects of communication are felt mostly immediately 
after the communication, only to dissipate a little later: 
therefore the necessity of frequent communication to 
maintain mutual cooperation cannot be overemphasized.
And in addition, this study suggests that a communicator 
who adopts an unfriendly approach while trying to induce 
another person to cooperate with him on some venture of 
mutual concern is more likely to induce the other to 
cooperate with him if the interaction is face-to-face 
than if it is by telephone. But in general, it was shown 
that a friendly approach in the communication interaction 
is more effective in inducing cooperation than an unfriendly
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approach.. This applies as much to inter-individital 
interactions within an organization as it does to 
inter-organizational interactions.
These same generalizations apply to most other 
interaction situations or competitions: husband-wife 
relationships, buyer-seller transactions, teacher-student 
interactions, union-management bargaining, international 
peace negotiations...All these types of situations can 
benefit from the indication that frequent communication 
from a friendly communicator is useful in maintaining 
a cooperative relationship. 
future Investigations
This study also open doors to a host of future 
investigations in the area of the effect of communication 
channel on interpersonal interactions.
first, a replication of this study would be necessary 
in order to establish the reliability of the major findings 
in this study, expecially the competitive behavior of the 
telephone-unfriendly condition, the cooperative behavior 
of subjects in the friendly conditions and the increase 
in cooperation immediately after each communication.
And then, some refinements could be made in the post- 
experimental rating scales in order to clarify a few 
unresolved issues, first, since some subjects experienced 
difficulty understanding the message rating scale, this 
scale should be re-written to include all the confederate's
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contingencies more clearly. Then, since one of the problems 
in interpreting prisoner1s dilemma results is that the 
competitive red choice may represent either an attempt 
at exploitation or a purely defensive maneuver (lerhune, 
1968), the replication should ask what is expected of the 
partner when the subject defects, in order to reveal 
with greater clarity the meaning of this choice. Next, 
the replication should include a question designed to 
answer the extent to which the subjects felt that they 
avoided the typical competitive orientation in favor of the 
individualistic orientation; this is important in inter­
preting the results.
Then further studies could be conducted varying 
other dimensions. Nor example, our subjects were instruct­
ed to concern themselves only with their own earnings 
(individualistic orientation). It would be necessary to 
include-in a future study instructions requesting the 
subjects to try and beat the other person (competitive 
orientation) and instructions requesting the subjects 
to help the other person (cooperative orientation).
Then we could investigate the effect of different commu­
nication channels and affect conditions in counteracting 
the competitive orientation and in supporting the coopera­
tive orientation.
In a similar vein, since in our experiment,
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subjects were unaware of the other person's cumulative 
outcome, another study should be undertaken in which the 
cumulative outcomes of both participants were announced. 
This should increase the competitive overtones of the 
experiment, which may be differentially counteracted by 
the various communication channels and affect conditions.
Then another study identical to ours should be 
run using male subjects and a male confederate in order 
to study male reactions with differing communication 
channels and affect conditions. In addition another 
study should be undertaken using males and females, 
with a confederate of the opposite sex, in order to 
study subject reactions to a confederate of the opposite 
sex for varying communication channels and affect 
conditions.
Another idea for a later investigation might be 
to study sender commitment versus receiver commitment 
(Deutsch, 1958) for various communication channels. 
Deutsch has noted that the sender is more prone to behave 
in accordance to his message than the receiver because 
the sender has committed himself by the very fact that 
he sent the message in the first place; on the other 
hand, the receiver is bound by no such commitment. It 
would be worthwhile studying the effects of different 
communication channels on sender and receiver commitment. 
Following from this, it might be interesting to program
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the confederate-receiver to cooperate or to compete with 
the subject-eommunicator, and to study the effect of this 
on the behavior of the subject-communicator for the 
various communication channels.
It would also be important to follow up on our 
observation that only the face-to-face condition— both 
friendly and unfriendly— failed to see an increase in 
cooperation after the second communication, whereas all 
the other communication conditions did.
It is also likely that the status of the other 
person may have different effects on subjects for 
different communication channels and affect conditions. 
Therefore, it might be useful to study the influence that 
another person of varying status has, related to the commu­
nication channel and to his approach.
In conclusion therefore, this study poses more 
questions, than it answers. Like most other studies in 
the area of communications, the generality of its results 
are laden with restrictions associated with the specific 
circumstances of the experiment. However, it does 
indicate that the communication channel and the dispo­
sition of the communicator are important considerations 
in research on communication. But its deepest value lies 
in flo fact that it invites further investigations on the 
effect of communication channel on interpersonal interactions.
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Figure 1
Figure 2
: Prototype of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
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Appendix B 
Payoff Matrix Used in this Experiment
V *4*-* 4 ’“•a." i ***>»>« ,t>4. ^
aabtoUUtwsabi
j W p WM M l M i
3 S 0 0 U  ~) x
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 0 1
Appendix C 
Items in the Interpersonal Trust Scale
Hypocracy is on the increase in our society.
This country has a dark future unless we can attract hetter 
people into politics.
Using the honor system of not having a teacher present during 
exams would probably result in increased cheating.
The United Nations will never be an effective force in keeping 
world peace.
Most people would be horrified if they knew how much news the 
public hears and sees is distorted.
Even though we have reports in newspapers, radio, and TV, it is 
hard to get objective accounts of public events.
If we really knew what was going on in international politics, 
the public would have reason to be more frightened than they 
now seem to be.
Many major national sports contests are fixed on one way or 
another.
Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do.
In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious
until they have provided evidence that they are trustworthy.
Eear of social disgrace or punishment rather than conscience 
prevents most people from breaking the law.
Parents usually can be relied upon to keep their promises.
The judiciary is a place where we can all get unbiased treatment.
It is safe to believe that in spite of what people say most 
people are primarily interested in their own welfare.
The future seems very promising.
Most elected public officials are really sincere in their 
campaign promises.
Most experts can be relied upon to tell the truth about the 
limits of their knowledge.
Most parents can be relied upon to carry out their threats 
of punishment.
In these competitive times one has to be alert or someone is 
likely to take advantage of you.
Most idealists are sincere and usually practice what they preach.
Most salesmen are honest in describing their products.
Most students in school would not cheat even if they were 
sure of getting away with it.
Most repairmen will not overcharge even if they think you are 
ignorant of their specialty.
Most people answer public opinion polls honestly.
A large share of accident claims filed against insurance companies 
are phony.
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Appendix D
Semantic Differential Rating ScaleItems of "Other Person"
assuring
pleasant
unpersuasive
inexperienced
credible
submissive
unselfish
unfriendly
strong
active
expert
altruistic
bad
subdued
trustworthy
biased
clever
incompetent
controlling
unfair
dull
competitive
meek
unskillful
admirable
unassuring
unpleasant
persuasive
experienced
suspicious
domineering
selfish
friendly
weak
passive
ignorant
egotistic
good
dynamic
tricky
objective
stupid
competent
unconstraining
fair
shrewd
cooperative
aggressive
skillful
contemptible
Items of "Experiment" Semantic Differential Rating Scale
good
honest
tiring
useful
fake
worthless
deceitful
interesting
unreal
bad
dishonest
engrossing
useless
authentic
valuable
genuine
boring
real
well executed poorly executed
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Appendix D (continued)
Items of "Message" Semantic Differential Rating Scale
Partner* s Intention 
communicated not communicated 
clear unclear
Partner* s Expectation of You 
communicated not communicated 
clear unclear
Partner* s Intention whenever 
You Play Red 
play red play "black
communicated not communicated 
clear unclear
Partner* s Intention whenever 
You Play Black "After Having 
Played Red 
play red play "black
communicated not communicated 
clear unclear
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Instructions to Subjects
You are about to participate in an experiment designed 
to study social interaction between two people. In front of 
you is a large letter. A, which, identifies you as person A. 
Please remember your letter because you will need to laiow this 
as the experiment progresses.
In this experiment, you will be interacting with 
another person stationed in the next room. This is person B.
This person, like you, is a volunteer from the introductory 
psychology class at the University of Windsor. She is receiv­
ing at this moment the same taped instructions as you.
With person B, you will be performing a task that 
has certain outcomes. The outcome will depend on what you 
as well as person B do.
In front of you on the desk is a matrix. Person B 
has the same matrix as you have. As you can see, this matrix 
is made up of four cells. Each cell contains possible outcomes 
for you and for person B. Take a moment to examine the matrix 
(pause). In this experiment, you will be required to make a 
choice between two rows that have been labelled " I choose"; 
that is, you choose between the rows identified by either a 
solid black circle or a solid red circle. Similarly, person B 
will make a choice between the two columns which have been 
labelled "Other chooses"; that is, person B will choose either 
the striped black circle or the striped red circle. In order 
to communicate your choice to me, you will place the block that 
you have in front of you in the appropriate solid colored circle. 
For example, to show me that you choose black, you place your 
block on the solid black circle; if you wish to choose red, 
place your block on the solid red circle. Please note that you 
place your block on either of the solid colored circles labelled 
"I choose". Person B will place her block on either of the 
striped colored circles labelled "Other Chooses".
Your outcome is determined by the row and column 
choices made by you and the other person. That is, your outcome 
will be delivered by the cell which the row choice and the column 
choice share. For example, suppose you chose black and person 
B chose black. The place where these choices overlap is in the 
upper left-hand cell; "I get 3^, other gets 3^"; therefore, 
you both get three cents. If your choice were black, but 
person B were to choose red instead this time, then you would 
be getting the outcomes from the upper right-hand cell; "I get 
04 , other gets 5^"; therefore, you would get nothing and 
person B would get five cents. If you chose red this time and 
person B chose black, your outcome would be found in the lower 
left-hand cell; "I get 5^ , other gets 0^"; therefore, you would 
get five cents and person B would get nothing. If you chose red 
and person B chose red also, then the outcome would be obtained 
from the l o w e r right-hand cell: "I get 1^, other gets 1^".
Note that the bM-ck-red color coding on the matrix 
has been designed to help you pin-point the outcome of each 
trial. That is, if you and person B both choose black, your
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outcome is delivered by the upper left-hand cell which is 
completely bound by a black border and in which both your outcome 
and Person B's outcome are written in black. On the other 
hand, if you and person B both choose red, the lower right-hand 
cell provides your outcome: note here that the border of this 
cell is completely red and both your outcome and person B's 
outcome are written in red. If, however, one of you chooses 
black and the other red, the outcomes will be obtained from 
either the upper right-hand cell or the lower left-hand cell; 
both cells are bound by black and red borders and one person's 
outcome is written in black and the other person's outcome 
is written in red.
Do not worry if you are not sure about how the matrix 
works. I will be in shortly to clear up any misunderstandings.
In the course of the experiment, you will get a
chance to make a series of separate choices, I will tell you
when each decision period begins. After you have each made 
your choice, I will inform you of your gains and ask you to remove 
your block in preparation for the next trial. Over successive 
trials, I will add up your total gains so that you will know
exactly what your total is as the experiment progresses (at
this point, tne experimenter enters the experimental room to 
make sure that the subject understands the game).
In this experiment, you will be able to earn money: 
that is, you get to keep all the money you accumulate in the 
course of the experiment. You will receive payment immedialely 
after this experiment. Therefore, you and person B stand a 
chance of earning money today, but how much you gain will 
depend on what you do and what the other person does.
Of course, it is best for you to gain as much as you 
can for yourself and lose as little as possible in the course 
of the experiment. Don't worry about the other person's 
earnings. Just concern yourself with what you can make.
Person B has also been instructed only to concern herself 
with her own earnings.
This experiment has been designed to study the effect 
of different channels of one-way communication on the behavior 
of two interacting people. Specifically, some of the subjects 
in this experiment will be able to communicate by means of 
face-to-face communication, others by means of closed-circuit 
television, others by means of the telephone and finally others 
by means of written notes, (depending on the experimental 
condition, the subjects received one of the following instructions)
— For your purposes, you shall be in the face-to-face 
communication condition. Since this is an experiment on one­
way communication, only one of you will be able to communicate 
with the otiier. Person B, by virtue of a randomized process, 
has been assigned the position of communicator in this experi­
ment; that is, at certain predetermined points during the 
experiment, I will allow her to enter your experimental room 
and communicate with you, if she so desires. She will sit 
down in front of you and will give you her message. You must 
not communicate with her. After Person B has finished, she will 
return to her own room and the experiment will continue as
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usual. Remember, you are not to speak to person B. She alone 
is allowed to speak.
— For your purposes, you shall be in the television 
communication condition. Since this is an experiment on one­
way communication, only one of you will be able to communicate 
with the other. Person 3, by virtue of a randomized process, 
has been assigned the position of communicator in this experi­
ment; that is, at certain predetermined points during the 
experiment, I will allow her to communicate with you by means 
of closed-circuit television, if she so desires. She will open 
the closed-circuit television, and then she will appear on the 
monitor in front of you and will speak to you. You will not 
be able to communicate with her. After she has spoken, she will 
shut the television and the experiment will continue as usual.
— For your purposes, you shall be in the telephone 
communication condition. Since this is an experiment on one­
way communication, only one of you will be able to communicate 
with the other. Person B, by virtue of a randomized process, 
has been assigned the position of communicator in this experi­
ment; that is, at certain predetermined points during the expe­
riment, I will allow her to communicate -with you by means of 
the telephone if she so desires. She will phone you and relay 
her message to you. You will not be able to communicate with 
her. After she has finished, she will hang up. You also are 
to hang up the telephone receiver and the experiment will 
continue as usual. Remember, you cannot speak to person B.
The transmitter in your telephone has been disconnected.
Person B alone is allowed to speak.
— For your purposes, you shall be in the written 
note communication condition. Since this is an experiment on 
one-way communication, only one of you will be able to commu­
nicate with the other. Person B, by virtue of a randomized 
process, has been assigned the position of communicator in this 
experiment: that is, at certain predetermined points during the 
experiment, I will allow her to communicate with you by means 
of written note if she so desires. She will write her note 
and pass it on to me to give to you. You will not be able to 
communicate with her. After you have read her message, the 
experiment will continue as usual.
— For your purposes, you shall not be able to communi­
cate with person B because you belong to the control group in 
this study.
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Friendly Communications
Communication 1:
Hi I (urnur ..) I think we've been given the same instruc­
tions. It would be to our best advantage if we both chose 
black. I'll choose black on the next trial; I hope you will too. 
If we're fair to each other, then, we'll both wjji. I'll follow 
whatever you do on the experiment. If you choose black, I'll 
choose black. If you choose red, I'll choose red on the next 
trial. OKay? Let's go.
Communication 2:
Well, I know I've got a better idea of what the 
experiment is all about. I hope you do too. It (ah...) I 
guess it's best if...if I choose whatever you choose on the trial 
before. If we both, choose black, then...then we'll both win, and 
make some money. If you choose red, I'll choose red on the 
next trial. I guess in the long run the black is our best 
choice. Uhh...Let's just be fair with each other and both 
choose black.
Communication 3a:
Things are going really good, Wei re both sharing in 
honesty and we're making money too. Let's keep on working 
great together.
Communication 3&:
Unfortunately we haven't been doing as well as we 
might. But on the last trial we both chose black and we both 
made some money. Let's keep on choosing black, from now on.
We should do well together from now on.
Communication 3c:
I'm sorry but we haven't been doing as well as we 
might together. If only you could talk to me. Well...I'm 
going to choose red on the next trial because you chose red on 
the last trial. I hope you'll choose black. But let's be honest 
with each other after that...and both keep on choosing black 
for the rest of the game. Then we'll both win and make some 
money. Okay?
Communication 3d:
It's too bad but we haven't been doing as well as we 
might. If only you could talk to me. Well let's get out of 
this rut and start choosing black. I'm going to choose black 
on the next trial because you chose black on the...on the last 
trial. This is a good point to keep on choosing black. And 
then we can make some money. Okay? Let's go...
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Unfriendly Communications
Communication 1:
I believe w e ' v e  b e e n given the same instructions... 
It would be to my advantage and to your advantage if I choose 
black and you choose black...Therefore...1 shall choose black 
and so should you...If you choose black, I will continue to 
choose black...Should you choose red, I will retaliate on the 
next trial and choose red...I will make a point of making the 
same choice as you did on the preceeding trial...You shall 
not take advantage of my position.
Communication 2:
It is obvious that the correct choice is a black 
choice...I have decided to take the same strategy as I took in 
the trials before...On the next trial, I shall choose black... 
I expect you to choose black...If you choose red, I will reta­
liate by choosing red on the trial after...In other words, I 
shall make a point of making the same choice as you made on 
the trial before.
Communication 3a:
I was correct in my thinking..1 trust you will 
continue to cooperate...
Communication 3b:
Unfortunately during the experiment you refused to 
cooperate fully with me...Continue to choose black as you did 
on the last trial...Then I will choose black...I hope I have 
made myself clear.
Communication 3c:
Unfortunately you refused to cooperate fully with me 
during the experiment...Obviously black...is the best choice 
in the long run...So on the next trial choose black...I shall 
choose red because you chose red on the last trial...But you 
must first show that your intentions are honest and choose 
black...Then 1 will choose black...I hope I have made myself 
clear...
Communication 3d:
Unfortunately you refuse to cooperate with me fully. 
Obviously black is the best choice in the long run...Because 
you chose black on the last trial, I will choose black on the 
next...Should you choose red on the next trial, I will choose 
red on the trial after,..! hope I have made myself clear...
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